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Aim: This thesis describes the development and initial validation of a questionnaire to 
measure Hayes, Strosahl and Wilson’s (1999) constructs of cognitive fusion and cognitive 
defusion.  Within the literature there is currently no specific measure of these constructs.   
 
Design and Method:  Principal Component Analysis was conducted on two independent 
samples (Study One n = 425 and Study Two n = 167).  Reliability analyses were conducted 
for both Study One and Study Two and validation analyses were conducted in Study Two.  
All participants in both studies completed the Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ).  
Participants in Study Two completed additional measures related to their satisfaction with 
life, their beliefs about worry, mindful responding to unpleasant thoughts and images and 
levels of experiential avoidance.    
 
Results: The final solution revealed a two component fifteen item questionnaire accounting 
for 54% of the variance.  Based on item content, the components were labelled fusion and 
defusion.  The items within the questionnaire reflected Hayes et al. (1999) constructs of 
cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion.  Internal consistencies as measured by Cronbach’s 
alpha were .91 (fusion), .71 (defusion) and .88 (total scale). The measure correlated 
moderately to highly and in the expected directions with questionnaires measuring individual 
beliefs about worry, mindful responding to unpleasant thoughts and images and levels of 
experiential avoidance.  Similarly, there was a significant negative correlation between the 
current questionnaire and a measure related to satisfaction with life.  





Conclusions:  The findings of the above research provide initial support for the CFQ.  The 
results show support for the validity of the scale including content and convergent validity of 





















1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
This thesis describes the evaluation and development of the Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire 
(hereafter referred to as CFQ), an instrument designed to measure Hayes, Strosahl and 
Wilson’s (1999) notions of cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion.  Both constructs are 
fundamental to the Acceptance and Commitment Therapy model (ACT).  Despite its central 
premise to the model, there is not currently a reliable and valid way of measuring these 
constructs.   
 
The present study provides an overview of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy’s position 
within the field of psychotherapy and an outline of where the model developed from.  A 
review of ACT’s underlying theoretical model will be provided focusing firstly on the 
constructs of experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion, and then latterly on the concept of 
cognitive defusion.  An operational definition of cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion is 
provided and both constructs inform the development of the items for the CFQ.  In order to 
provide a justification for the development of this measure, a review is provided on current 
questionnaires that assess similar constructs to cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion.  The 
review concludes that these measures inadequately address key aspects associated with Hayes 
et al’s. (1999) notion of cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion.  Finally, the procedures for 










1.1 Acceptance and Commitment Therapy: The “Third Wave of Behaviour   
Therapy 
 
During the past several years there has been a recognisable change within the literature 
particularly in the field of behavioural and cognitive therapies (Hayes, 2004b).  The history of 
behaviour therapy over the past half century has been divided into three semi-distinct eras 
(Hayes, 2004b). The first wave of behaviour therapy emerged in the late 1950s and continued 
into the 1960s, which developed via the limitations of psychoanalytic theory (Forman and 
Herbert, 2006).  Behaviour therapy adopted an empirical, objective and scientific stance to 
the understanding and treatment of psychological problems.  Within the approach, 
problematic behaviour was modified through classical (Wolpe, 1958) and operant (Skinner, 
1953) learning principles.  However, in the late 1960s through to the 1990s greater emphasis 
was being placed on the importance of cognitive factors to both theory and practice (Brewin, 
2006).  Bandura’s (1969) work on observational learning was particularly important in 
drawing attention to cognitive factors as playing a critical role in individuals’ interpretation 
of environmental stimuli.  This era was referred to as the second wave of behaviour therapy.  
Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (Ellis, 1962) and Cognitive Therapy (Beck, Rush, 
Shaw and Emergy, 1979) were amongst several of the psychotherapies that were developed 
that combined cognitive and behavioural change strategies (Brewin, 2006). 
 
The defining feature of Beck et al’s. (1979) cognitive model is the assumption that 
therapeutic effects are mediated by changes in cognitions, including thoughts, beliefs and 
schemas (Forman, Herbert, Moitra, Yeomans and Geller, 2007).  The cognitive model is 
often supplemented with a number of behaviour change methods.  However, the fundamental 





purpose of these behaviour change strategies is to effect a change in dysfunctional cognitive 
structures and processes (Beck et al. 1979).  Although cognitive therapy incorporates some of 
the behavioural principles, the approach is largely distinguished from the larger family of 
behaviour therapies because of its emphasis on cognitive factors in addition to the direct 
attempts to modify cognitive processes (Longmore and Worrell, 2006).  Challenging the 
meaning of dysfunctional thoughts can be achieved by evaluating the evidence for and 
against a thought using written thought records, eliciting more realistic thoughts and looking 
for evidence of distorted thinking.  While Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT) can be 
conceptualised as a broad umbrella of related models of psychotherapy, cognitive therapy is 
the most well known and researched model (Beck, 2005).   
 
To date there are now over 325 published outcome studies on cognitive behavioural 
interventions (Butler, Chapman, Forman and Beck, 2006).   A recent review of 16 meta-
analyses found multi-study support for the effectiveness of cognitive therapy to treat a 
plethora of disorders and problems including unipolor and bipolar depression, panic disorder, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, social anxiety disorder, generalised anxiety disorder and 
bulimia nervosa (Butler et al. 2006).  There is substantial literature supporting the efficacy of 
cognitive therapy when compared to a number of control conditions including 
pharmacological interventions (Beck, 1997).  However, it is also widely accepted that there 
are a number of factors that potentially bias the results of these findings and numerous 
limitations within the studies have been identified including the control conditions used, the 
level of training of therapists used in their studies and study therapists’ allegiances to specific 
approaches (Longmore and Worrell, 2006).   





1.2 Limitations of the second wave therapies 
 
A number of authors have questioned whether therapists need to use logico-rational strategies 
to directly challenge maladaptive thoughts (Longmore and Worrell, 2006).  Within the 
literature a number of treatment component analyses have failed to support the postulated 
mediator in cognitive therapy thus raising doubts as to whether cognitive interventions 
provide significant value to therapy.  McManus, Clark and Hackmann (2000) compared the 
outcomes of twenty three individuals with social phobia who either received cognitive 
therapy or pharmacology with instructions for self-administered exposure.  Belief change for 
the key cognitions thought to underlie social phobia was measured by the Social Probability 
and Cost Questionnaire (SPCQ; Foa, Frankin, Perry and Herbert, 1996).  The authors found 
that by the end of treatment there were equally significant reductions in participants’ 
estimations of the probability and cost of negative social events in both treatment conditions.   
 
Simons, Garfield and Murphy (1984) studied both symptom and cognitive change in twenty 
eight depressed outpatients who received either cognitive therapy or pharmacotherapy.  As 
measured on the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS; Weissman and Beck, 1979) and the 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ; Hollon and Kendall, 1980) both cognitive therapy 
and pharmacotherapy produced similar levels of change on the cognitive as well as the 
symptom measures.  The authors concluded that the cognitive change was a part of the 
improvement seen in treatment, rather than a primary cause of improvement.   
 
These findings are further supported by Oei and Free (1995) who meta-analytically tested the 
relationship of non-cognitive psychological therapies and change in cognitions.  They found 





that cognitive therapy and other therapies did not differ significantly in terms of their effect 
on cognition.  The authors also found that drug therapies were found to produce changes in 
cognitions equivalent to the two classes of psychological treatments.   
 
Jacobson and Hollon (1996) also provide evidence that cognitive interventions are not needed 
to effect changes in cognition.  The authors assigned depressed participants to one of three 
conditions, behavioural activation; behavioural activation plus coping skills related to 
automatic thoughts, and complete cognitive treatment, which included behavioural activation, 
coping skills and identification and modification of core dysfunctional schemas.  Jacobson 
and Hollon (1996) found that behavioural activation altered negative thinking and 
dysfunctional attributional styles to the same degree as either of the two cognitive treatments.  
Moreover, they found that all three treatments were equally efficacious.  However, Longmore 
and Worrell (2007) argue that the behavioural activation condition may have entailed the 
modification of dysfunctional thoughts and assumptions.  They also state that the two 
cognitive treatments were not less effective, but rather equally effective. 
 
1.3 Third Generation Behaviour Therapies 
 
Within the literature new breeds of CBT have emerged. These breeds have established 
themselves as the ‘third generation behaviour therapies’ or ‘acceptance-based’ therapies as 
they are sometimes referred to (Corcoran and Segal, 2008).  The new “third wave” therapies 
place emphasis on the relationship between the person and their thoughts and feelings 
(Fletcher and Hayes, 2005).  More specifically Hayes (2004b) notes that, 
 





“Grounded in an empirical, principle focused approach, the third wave of behavior and 
cognitive therapy is particularly sensitive to the context and functions of psychological 
phenomena, not just in their form and this tends to emphasize contextual and experiential 
change strategies in addition to more direct and didactic ones.  These treatments tend to seek 
the construction of broad, flexible and effective repertoires over an eliminative approach to 
narrowly defined problems, and to emphasize the relevance of the issues they examine for 
clinicians as well as clients” (p.658).  
 
Examples of such third generation therapies include Dialectical Behavior Therapy, DBT, 
(Linehan, 1993), Functional Analytic Psychotherapy, FAP, (Kohlenberg and Tsai, 1991) 
Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy, MBCT, (Segal, Teasdale and Williams, 2002) and 
Integrative Behavioural Couples Therapy, IBCT, (Jacobson and Christensen, 1996). 
Together, these approaches have gained increasing prominence in recent years.  Another 
example is Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) (Hayes, Strosahl and Wilson, 
1999). 
 
1.4 Acceptance and Commitment Therapy: The Theoretical and Philosophical 
Underpinnings of the Model 
 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) evolved, in part, from traditional cognitive and 
behavioural models (Zettle, 2005).  The approach is considered as a modern form of 
behavioural analysis due to its philosophical and theoretical underpinnings (Hayes et al. 
1999).  According to Hayes and colleagues (1999) the approach is rooted in a pragmatic 





philosophical position called functional contextualism (Hayes and Reese 1988).  
Underpinning the notion of functional contextualism is the idea that the whole event is 
primary (Twohig, Masuda, Varra and Hayes, as cited in Orsillo and Roemes, 2005).  This 
essential analytic unit of functional contextualism is the component described as the ‘ongoing 
act in context’.  This concept is linked to four core components that include focusing on the 
whole event and sensitivity to the role of context in understanding the nature and function of 
an event.  For example from an ACT perspective, if a client is struggling with a thought, 
emphasis would not be placed on establishing whether that thought is true or rational 
(Twohig et al. 2005).  Rather, the authors suggest the primary issue is to understand the 
whole event, the function that the thought serves, the condition in which the thought occurs, 
how the person reacts to the thought and, importantly, what the entire pattern of action is in 
the service of.  The approach emphasizes that the contextual features do not assemble the 
whole unit, they are facets of the whole unit and for this reason the entire analysis is viewed 
contextualistically (Hayes et al. 1999).   
 
Through the environment, the behaviour analyst attempts to identify aspects that influence 
the occurrence, frequency and intensity of both private and overt psychological events.  Once 
established, the approach attempts to alter the function of unwanted thoughts and feelings by 









1.5 ACT’s Theory of Psychopathology: The Process of Language and Relational 
Frame Theory 
 
From an ACT perspective, human suffering and psychological discomfort are viewed as  
inevitable parts of human existence (Hayes et al. 1999).  To account for this, the authors 
suggest that the complexity of the human brain allows one the unlimited possibility to think 
about abstract concepts that enable us to put ourselves in painful situations, regardless of our 
external circumstances.  They put forward the suggestion that human beings have the ability 
to plan in advance and anticipate consequences far into the future.  Hayes, Luoma, Bond, 
Mausda and Lillis (2006) suggest that it is this, in combination with the way in which 
language and cognition interact with direct contingencies to produce an inability to persist or 
change behaviour in the service of long-term valued ends, that leads to psychopathology.   
 
The idea that language underpins psychopathology is linked to Relational Frame Theory 
(RFT), a theory that attempts to explain human language and cognition in behavioural terms 
(Hayes, Barnes-Holmes and Roche, 2001).  The authors propose that RFT is a theory of 
verbal behaviour that is based upon principles derived from laboratory research on rule 
governance, stimulus equivalence and derived relational responding.   To date, at least 
seventy empirical studies have been published in the past thirteen years (Hayes et al. 2001; 
Blackledge, 2003; Hayes, 2004b).  However, the theory is considered to remain relatively 
unknown outside behaviourist circles for several reasons (Blackledge, 2003).  According to 
Blackledge (2003) many people continue to be unaware of it or continue to misunderstand its 
implications.  He proposes three reasons for this.  Firstly, he states that the authors of the 
theory use obscure and highly technical language to describe the theory.  Secondly, the 





importance of human psychopathology and language in general is not obvious and finally 
psychologists who are not active behaviourists have long assumed that behaviourism has little 
if anything to do with understanding human cognition and language (Blackledge, 2003).  
 
According to RFT, human beings learn to derive and combine stimulus relations and to bring 
them under arbitrary contextual control (Twohig et al. 2005).  The notion of relationships 
between stimuli (i.e. by deriving relations among events, among words and events, words and 
words, and events and events), is referred to as relational learning.   
 
From an RFT perspective, Twohig et al. (2005) identify six key concepts in relational 
learning.  Firstly, relations show mutual entailment.  The authors refer to mutual entailment 
as a person learning in a particular context that A relates in a particular way to B.  The person 
derives that B and A entail some kind of relation in that context.  For example, if “going into 
town” is said to be more fearful than “going into a shop”, then a person can derive the 
relation that “going into a shop” is less fearful than “going into town” without direct training 
(Twohig et al. 2005).  Secondly, the authors propose that such relations show combinatorial 
entailment, that is if a person learns in a particular context that A relates in a particular way to 
B, and B relates in a particular way to C, then this must entail some kind of mutual entailment 
between A and C in that context.  A further example the authors provide is that if doing a 
public speech is also more fearful than going into town, then doing a public speech is also 
more fearful than going into a shop.  The authors propose that the fundamental premise in 
this example is that the individual never needs to experience public speaking to feel 
significant anxiety in that situation as the learning occurred relationally.  Thirdly, emphasis is 





placed on the role of context as a determining factor in how events are relationally framed.  
Fourthly, according to Twohig et al. (2005) this relational context is initially acquired 
through multiple exemplar training.  Multiple exemplar training is thought to involve a very 
large number of training trials across a variety of situational contexts that specify the 
response and the stimuli that occasion it.  The authors contend that as a result of the many 
trials, no specific feature alone can evoke relational framing.  This highlights the important 
role of context and how events become relationally framed.  The fifth factor that Twohig et 
al. (2005) propose is that the direct or acquired functions of one event in a relational network 
can transform the stimulus functions of related events in accord with the underlying relation 
among them.  Their final concept highlights that transformation of stimulus functions is 
controlled by a functional context that is also initially acquired through multiple exemplar 
training. For example, the statement, “I cannot do a presentation because I’m scared of 
making a fool of myself”, includes cues to transform the function of the presentation to be a 
highly anxiety provoking event.  According to the authors this latter example captures the 
importance of understanding both verbal/cognitive and direct contingency streams when 
trying to understand human behaviour.           
 
In line with RFT is the idea that humans are continuously deriving relations among events, 
words, feelings, experiences and images as they engage with their environment, interact with 
others, think, observe and reason  (Twohig et al. 2005).  The authors suggest that stimuli that 
have never previously been directly associated with or trained can become relational and that 
those relations can transform stimulus functions among related stimuli.   
 





The RFT model described above provides a basis for the assumption that psychological 
difficulties emerge from unhelpful contextual control over language processes (Hayes et al. 
2006).  It would appear that while the processes of language and cognition enable us to solve 
problems, the very same processes allow for evaluation and comparison and the ability to 
regurgitate painful past to present experiences (Baer, 2006).   Thus, while the authors 
acknowledge the advantages of language and human beings’ accomplishments as a result of 
our verbal abilities, they also recognize the drawbacks. 
 
Hayes and colleagues (1999) acknowledge that relational learning has a number of significant 
implications.  Human suffering, in the authors’ view, originates from psychological 
inflexibility fostered by two core ACT processes, experiential avoidance and cognitive 
fusion.  They argue that these specific ACT processes not only amplify psychological 
disorder but they also contribute to intensifying the suffering experienced by the individual.    
 
For the purposes of the current research only the roles of experiential avoidance and cognitive 












1.6 ACT and Psychopathology: Experiential Avoidance and Cognitive Fusion 
 
1.6.1 Experiential Avoidance 
 
The phenomenon of experiential avoidance occurs when a person demonstrates an 
unwillingness to be in contact with specific private experiences such as bodily sensations, 
emotions, thoughts, memories and images, particularly when these private experiences are 
evaluated negatively (Hayes et al. 1999).  Hayes and Gifford (1997) acknowledge that 
experiential avoidance is not in its essence problematic.  However, they argue that as a 
psychological strategy it does appear to underlie several forms of psychopathology, including 
depression and anxiety.  The authors suggest that individuals achieve avoidance by altering 
the form, frequency and context of difficult or unwanted private experiences.  Clinical 
presentations of experiential avoidance include substance abuse, dissociation, binge eating or 
avoidance of people, places and situations (Baer, 2006). According to Blackledge and Hayes 
(2001) experiential avoidance is positively correlated with higher levels of psychopathology.  
However, the process may also interfere with an individual’s progress towards valued goals 
and the authors argue that this predominantly results in a lower quality of life.   
 
This leads one to question why individuals would engage in such a process that is ultimately 
counterproductive and largely destructive.  In response to this, Hayes, Strosahl, Wilson et al. 
(2004) propose that counterproductive strategies like distraction prevent contact with those 
aversive experiences and as a result the distress and discomfort associated with those 
experiences are eliminated or reduced in the short term.  However some authors, in particular 
Blackledge and Hayes (2001) argue that attempts to control, avoid or distract oneself from 





particular thoughts or emotions may result in an increase in those unwanted thoughts or 
emotions.  This process is captured in the quote below,  
 
“Again and again I have said to myself, on lying down at night, after a day embittered by 
some vexatious matter, ‘I will not think of it any more!...it can do no good whatever to go 
through it again. I will think of something else!’ And in another ten minutes I have found 
myself, once more, in the very thick of the miserable business, and torturing myself,  to no 
purpose, with all the old troubles”.  (Lewis Carroll, as cited in Wenzlaff and Wegner, 2000, 
p.1).   
 
Numerous studies within the literature show that deliberate attempts to suppress private 
phenomena paradoxically leads to an increase in the prevalence of those phenomena (Hayes, 
2004b).  The ‘white bear’ experiment by Wegner, Schneider, Carter and White (1987) is an 
archetypal example of the effects of thought suppression.  They found that when participants 
were instructed to suppress thoughts of a white bear they found it difficult to do so and 
actually reported higher incidences of ‘white bear’ thoughts compared to those participants 
who had not been instructed to suppress.   
 
Further evidence for the process of suppression is illustrated in a wide range of psychological 
disorders, including for example obsessive compulsive disorder and generalized anxiety 
disorder.   For example, Trinder and Salkovskis (1994) asked participants to identify a 
negative intrusive thought and to record the occurrence of the thought over a period of four 
days.  Participants were assigned to one of three conditions and were advised to either to 





record their intrusions (record only), suppress their thoughts (suppression) or to try and think 
about their thoughts as they occurred (expression). The results indicated that participants who 
had received the suppression instruction had suffered more intrusive thoughts than those in 
the other conditions.  The study also indicated that those in the suppression condition had 
higher levels of discomfort compared to those in the other conditions.  This suggests that 
suppression may not only increase the number of thoughts experienced but may also make 
them aversive.  Relatedly, Salkovskis and Campbell (1994) found a higher rate of personally 
intrusive thoughts in participants who tried to suppress thoughts compared to those who 
simply monitored them.   
 
Thought suppression has also been linked to subjectively higher levels of experienced pain 
(Sullivan, Rouse, Bishop and Johnston, 1997).  Similarly, suppression of urges to engage in 
alcohol consumption is related to increases in the expected reinforcing effect of alcohol by 
heavy drinkers (Palfai, Monti, Colby and Rohsenow, 1997).   
 
In summary, universal and naturally occurring processes of relational learning and 
experiential escape and avoidance amplified by cultural forces suggesting that control over 
internal experiences are possible and desirable, are the very same processes that increase 









1.6.2 Cognitive Fusion 
 
Cognitive fusion represents another by-product of relational framing.  The phenomenon of 
cognitive fusion occurs when one becomes entangled or fused with the literal context of there 
thoughts (Hayes et al. 1999).  These thoughts and the related emotions are described by 
Hayes, Strosahl, Bunting et al. (2004) as becoming entangled to such an extent that the 
thoughts are then taken as true interpretations of experiences to the extent that individuals 
become indistinguishable from their internal experience.  It is postulated that when people are 
in this fused mode, they fail to see the content of their thoughts as an automatic and 
idiosyncratic reaction to certain events.  The essence of the process sucks people into losing 
contact with the present not just in terms of social and physical contact but also psychological 
contact as well (Hayes et al.1999). 
 
The authors refer back to RFT to account for the theoretical underpinnings concerning 
cognitive fusion (Hayes et al. 1999).  They propose that in some contexts, the bidirectional 
nature of verbal relations is such that verbal stimuli and their referents fuse together or 
become functionally inseparable.  From this perspective Wilson and Hayes (as cited in 
Orsillo and Roemes, 2005) consider relational networks as highly resistant to “unlearning”, 
even in the face of contradictory learning.  They further suggest that behaviour governed by 
relational networks are highly insensitive to shifting environmental contingencies.  The 
implication of cognitive fusion is that of prolonged and chronic psychological distress and 
rigidity in behavioural responding (Hayes et al. 1999).   
 





The idea that recurrent negative thinking increases and maintains psychopathology has been 
evidenced elsewhere in the literature.  Substantial research shows that individuals who 
ruminate in response to negative emotions experience more depressive symptoms, greater 
risk for future depressive episodes and longer durations of depression (Conway, Csank, Holm 
and Blake, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow 1993). 
 
Further evidence is provided by Rachman (1998) and Salkovskis (1998).  Wenzlaff and 
Wegner (2000) propose that people can become excessively self-critical and alarmed by their 
unsuccessful attempts at regulating their thoughts if they have unrealistically high 
expectations concerning their mental control abilities or if they magnify the significance of 
unwanted thoughts.  They suggest that this process of attempted thought control deprives 
them of adequate cognitive resources, further undermining their mental-control efforts, which 
sets into motion a downward spiral of mental control failures.  In turn, they highlight that this 
mental state erodes personal control and contributes to anxiety, despondency and 
hopelessness (Rachman, 1998; Salkovskis, 1998).  This theory is further supported by Segal, 
Hood, Shaw and Higgins (1988) who highlight that thinking about negative aspects of the 
self or a negative situation serves to perpetuate rather than resolve negative feelings. 
 
In line with ACT’s theory of psychopathology, cognitive fusion results in a loss of contact 
with the present, which is linked to further increases in psychological inflexibility (Hayes et 
al. 1999).  The authors suggest that the verbal construction of the self, the past and the future 
gains more control over other behaviours and prevents the person from accessing the current 
environment.  The outcome of this is that individual values or long term ideals become less 





important and a lack of clarity regarding one’s own values further fuels the process of 
psychological inflexibility (Hayes et al. 1999).   
 
1.7 Core Processes in ACT 
 
A central feature of the ACT model is its focus on behavioural change (Hayes et al. 1999).  
The model emphasises contextual and experiential change methods to alter the function of 
psychological events without directly intervening with their frequency or form (Baer, 2006).  
This is achieved by teaching people to “just notice”, accept and embrace their thoughts, 
feelings, sensations, memories and other private events, particularly unwanted ones (Hayes et 
al. 1999; Hayes, 2004b).  In accordance with the model, the core aim is to build up and 
establish greater psychological flexibility with the aim of achieving contact with the present 
moment more fully as a conscious human being, and to change or persist with behavior when 
doing so serves valued ends (Hayes et al. 1999; Hayes, 2004b; Fletcher and Hayes, 2005).  
The authors suggest that this is made possible in ACT through six processes: acceptance, 
cognitive defusion, the self as context, contact with the present moment, values and 
committed action.  From an RFT point of view, the authors suggest that each of these 
components influence linguistic processes.   
 
According to the authors, the six components of ACT are inter-related (Hayes et al. 1999), 
and the core aim is to target psychological inflexibility.  The combination of the six processes 
are thought to lead to psychological flexibility, which is defined by Hayes et al. (1999) as the 
ability to contact the present moment more fully as a conscious human being and to persist 
with change behaviour in the service of chosen values. 





For the purpose of the present research only the construct of Cognitive Defusion will be 
outlined and discussed. 
 
1.7.1 Cognitive Defusion 
 
Cognitive defusion is the process of undermining the behaviour regulatory functions and 
literal believability of verbally entangled events (Twohig et al. 2005).  ACT techniques 
aimed at the process of cognitive defusion are designed to reduce the functions of thoughts by 
altering the verbal contexts in which they occur (Masuda, Hayes, Sackett and Twohig, 2004).   
The core purpose of ACT’s defusion strategies is to help the individual to see thoughts and 
feelings as essentially just experiences rather than a structured reality (Pankey and Hayes, 
2003).  Clients are taught to observe their thoughts and the process of thinking without 
assuming that their thoughts are true or important and without always behaving in accordance 
with their thought content (Baer, 2006).   Greater emphasis is placed on allowing thoughts to 
come and go regardless of how aversive and emotionally charged they may be.   
 
Like all ACT principles the aim is not to alter the form, frequency, or situational severity of 
the thoughts themselves (Hayes et al. 1999).  From an RFT perspective, the process of 
cognitive defusion is aimed at increasing the likelihood of acceptance (Twohig et al. 2005) 
which, in turn, assists the individual in breaking through the usual avoidance patterns.  The 
central aim is to allow constructive behaviour even in the presence of unwanted thoughts.  
Several micro-studies on cognitive defusion have been conducted to see if the process works 
in accordance with the theory. 





Bach and Hayes (2002) examined the impact of ACT with eighty inpatients with positive 
psychotic symptoms.  Participants were randomly assigned to either a treatment as usual 
(TAU) condition or to four sessions of ACT plus TAU.  Patients in the ACT condition were 
taught to accept unavoidable events, to notice psychotic symptoms without treating them as 
either true or false and to identify and work toward valued goals despite their symptoms.  The 
researchers found that participants in the ACT condition showed a rate of re-hospitalisation 
which was half that of the TAU rate over a four month follow up period.  The authors 
contend that this finding was not accounted for by increased medication compliance or by a 
reduction in the experience of psychotic symptoms.  Interestingly, Bach and Hayes (2002) 
found that participants in the ACT condition showed significantly higher symptom reporting: 
twenty two ACT patients (63%) versus eleven TAU patients (31%) admitted symptoms at 
follow up.  However, although the ACT participants reported more symptoms, those who did 
so were four times more likely to stay out of hospital.  Furthermore, ACT participants 
showed reduced believability in the literal reality of the symptoms they experienced.  The 
authors found that no participants in the ACT condition who admitted symptoms and showed 
reduced believability in them were re-hospitalised.  Bach and Hayes (2002) propose that 
acceptance and defusion processes were likely to be mediating the relationship between 
symptoms and re-hospitalisation. Ost (2008) identifies several methodological issues with 
this study.  Firstly, he questions the validity of the TAU condition.  In particular, he 
highlights that the TAU condition protocol is not specified and he also states that the authors 
have very little knowledge of what the condition entails because it is not subject to 
audio/visual recording.  A further criticism is that the patients in the TAU condition receive 
significantly less hours of treatment compared to patients in the active treatment group.  Ost 
(2008) argues that only one therapist is used in this study.  He suggests that this study could 





have been improved with more than one therapist delivering treatment in order to avoid the 
pitfalls of having only one therapist.   
 
A more recent study by Gaudiano and Herbert (2006) found similar results to Bach and 
Hayes (2002) study.  Gaudiano and Herbert (2006) randomly assigned forty psychiatric 
inpatients with psychotic symptoms to an enhanced treatment as usual condition (ETAU) and 
an enhanced treatment as usual condition plus four sessions of ACT (ETAU and ACT).  The 
ETAU condition consisted of psychopharmacology, case management and psychotherapy on 
the unit.  An ACT therapist also consulted with the patient’s individual treatment team for 
approximately fifteen minutes per day.  The ETAU and ACT condition consisted of the 
ETAU described above plus four ACT sessions focusing on the following themes: 
willingness as an alternative to control/controllable events, workability as a guide to coping 
strategies, acceptance of uncontrollable versus controllable events, and products of the mind 
as mental events and not facts about the self or the world.  The authors found that at 
discharge from hospital, participants in the ETAU and ACT condition showed an overall 
improvement in affective symptomatology, social impairment and distress associated with 
hallucinations.  Moreover, more participants in the ACT condition reached clinically 
significant symptom improvement at discharge.  While four month re-hospitalisation rates 
were lower in the ACT group, the authors found that the effect was not statistically 
significant.  However, they did find that participants in the ACT condition had decreases in 
the believability of their hallucinations during treatment.  This change in believability was 
thought to be strongly associated with a change in distress after controlling for a change in 
the frequency of hallucinations (Gaudiano and Herbert, 2006).   
 





In a study by Masuda, Hayes, Sackett and Twohig (2004), the authors tested out the impact of 
cognitive defusion using a technique first proposed by Titchener (1916) nearly ninety years 
ago.  Titchener (1916,p.425) proposed that when a word is said aloud and repeated, the 
context required for words to have literal meaning is removed.  The authors compared a 
defusion technique (i.e. repeating the word “milk”) with a distraction task and to a thought 
control task on reductions in the discomfort and believability of self-relevant negative 
thoughts.  Eight participants were firstly asked to generate self-relevant negative thoughts 
that they found particularly disturbing.  In the thought control task participants were invited 
to control their negative thoughts by either confronting them, changing them to positive 
forms, distracting themselves from their thoughts and/or by suppressing them.  Masuda and 
his colleagues (2004) found that repetition of negative self-referential words reduced 
participant’s believability and negative emotional impact over and above that of the 
comparison conditions.  However, there are several limitations to the above research.  Firstly, 
the low number of participants raises issues of questionable power.  Future research in this 
area could benefit from including a greater number of participants.  Secondly, there is a lack 
of clarity about what precise strategies participants were using in the thought control 
condition.  This makes it difficult to tease apart what functions in the thought control 
condition were more or less effective than the defusion technique.  Thirdly, the authors do not 
clarify how the cognitive defusion exercise (repetition of the word “milk”) is different from a 
distraction task.  A further condition examining this issue may provide further support for 
cognitive defusion as a technique if found to be successful.  Despite the limitations of this 
study, Masuda et al’s. (2004) findings represent a piece of research that solely targets the 
construct of cognitive defusion.   
 





Hayes, Bissett, Korn et al. (1999) examined the impact of a ninety minute ACT protocol 
focussing exclusively on the constructs of acceptance and defusion in a pain tolerance cold 
pressor task.  The authors compared the ACT protocol to a CBT pain management analogue 
condition and to an attention placebo condition, which consisted of a discussion of a 
behavioural approach to pain.  Thirty-two college students were randomly assigned to one of 
the three conditions.  The acceptance and defusion protocol examined the paradoxical effects 
of emotional control, an attempt to undermine feelings and thoughts as reasons for actions, 
the workability of emotional control and defusion of thoughts and feelings from the self.  The 
authors found no differences in the intensity of pain at post intervention.  However, 
participants in the acceptance and defusion condition were able to keep their hand in the cold 
water significantly longer than participants in the other conditions at post-test.  They also 
found that participants in the acceptance condition revealed lower levels of belief in pain-
oriented reasons for action than the other groups.   
 
Takahasi, Muto, Tada and Sugiyama (2002) replicated the procedures used in Hayes et al’s. 
(1999) study above.  However, they examined whether the acceptance and defusion exercises 
were needed in order to increase tolerance time in a cold pressor task or whether rationale 
alone could produce similar results.  The authors randomly assigned twenty-eight participants 
to one of three conditions.  Each condition had a different rationale.  The first condition took 
its rationale from a lecture on the theory of ACT and brief practice about acceptance; the 
second condition took a rationale that contained the theory of ACT and brief practice about 
the adverse effects of thought suppression; the third condition was a placebo group.  The 
second condition incorporated the following ACT exercises, the leaves on the stream 
mindfulness exercise (Hayes et al. 1999; p158-161) and the physicalizing defusion exercise 





(Hayes et al. 1999; p.170-171). Both exercises are designed to undermine the literal impact of 
difficult private events. The authors found that participants in the first and second condition 
showed significantly increased understanding of the theory of ACT.  However, they also 
found that participants in the acceptance-based condition that included acceptance and 
defusion exercises (the second condition) revealed a significantly greater tolerance of pain 
compared to the first and placebo condition.  The authors concluded that for longer tolerance 
in a cold pressor task, knowledge of ACT’s theory alone is not sufficient and that practice 
and experience are essential.  One of the main concerns about Hayes et al’s. (1999) study and 
Takahasi et al’s. (2002) study is whether these findings from the cold pressor tasks can be 
generalised to clinical presentations (i.e. the tolerance of anxiety or depressive rumination).  
It is arguable that the above findings cannot be credited with external validity.  Further 
research is required in order to provide support for the theoretical basis of cognitive defusion 
to a clinical population.      
 
Within the literature Ost (2008) has provided a detailed systematic review and meta-analysis 
of the third wave of behavioural therapies including ACT.  More specifically, he compares 
thirteen ACT RCT’s and traditional CBT studies to assess the methodological properties of 
the studies, to meta-analytically assess their efficacy and to investigate whether those 
identified studies fulfil the criteria for empirically supported treatments (ESTs). Of the 
thirteen RCT’s selected there were two on depression (Zettle and Hayes, 1986; Zettle and 
Rains, 1989), two on stress (Bond and Bunce, 2000; Dahl, Wilson and Nilsson, 2004), two on 
psychosis (Bach and Hayes, 2002; Gaudiano and Herbert, 2006), one on mathematics anxiety 
(Zettle, 2003), one on smoking (Gifford, Kohlenberg, Hayes et al. 2004), one on opiate 
dependence (Hayes, Wilson et al. 2004),  one on trichotillomania (Woods, Wetterneck and 





Flessner, 2006), one on epilepsy (Lundgren, Dahl et al. 2006), one on borderline personality 
disorder (Gratz and Gunderson, 2006) and finally one on diabetes (Gregg, Callaghan et al. 
2007).  There were 677 participants in total when these studies were combined together.  
Each study was evaluated on a scale, designed by Ost (2008), to rate the methodological 
rigour of psychotherapy outcomes studies.  Several items on this scale included the clarity of 
the sample description, the severity/chronicity of the disorder, the representativeness of the 
sample and the reliability of the diagnosis in question to name but a few.  Ost (2008) 
identified a number of methodological problems in several areas of the ACT studies 
including the methodological designs, the number of therapists used in the studies, treatment 
adherence and therapists’ competence, reliability of diagnosis, sample representativeness and 
the follow-up methods adopted after treatment.  Each of these areas will now be discussed in 
further detail.   
 
Ost (2008) identified that six studies (Zettle and Hayes, 1986; Zettle and Rains, 1989; Bond 
and Bunce, 2000; Zettle, 2003; Dahl et al. 2004; Gifford et al. 2004) did not use a diagnostic 
system to diagnose participants.  More specifically, he found that the proportion of studies 
using any diagnostic system was significantly lower in the ACT studies (54%) than in the 
CBT studies (100%).  He also found that three studies (by Zettle and Hayes, 1986; Zettle and 
Rains, 1989; Gratz and Gunderson, 2006) had only female participants.  Three studies (by 
Zettle, 2003; Gratz and Gunderson, 2006; Gregg et al. 2007) were found to have no follow-
up at all and only two studies (by Gifford et al. 2004; Lundgren et al. 2006) reported a 1-year 
follow up, with a mean of 4.2 months (Ost, 2008).  Ost (2008) also highlights specific issues 
with the number of therapists involved with some of the ACT studies.  More specifically, he 
states that it is necessary within studies to have more than one therapist delivering treatment 





in order to avoid a confounding therapist and treatment condition.  However, in eight ACT 
studies (by Zettle and Rains, 1989; Bach and Hayes, 2002; Zettle, 2003; Gaudiano and 
Herbert, 2006; Woods et al. 2006; Gratz and Gunderson, 2006; Gregg et al. 2007) only one 
therapist was used.  Four of the ACT studies did not provide any information regarding the 
number of therapists (Ost, 2008).   
 
In terms of therapist adherence and therapist competence, only two of the thirteen ACT 
studies (by Hayes et al. 2004; Zettle and Rains, 1989) reported any form of adherence ratings.  
Ost (2008) identifies that therapist adherence ratings when delivering treatment are essential 
in order to verify that researchers are adhering to the treatment that they say they are 
delivering.  Rather alarmingly, Ost (2008) also found that in terms of therapist competence 
ratings no ACT study reported having an independent expert on the respective treatment 
rating the therapists’ competence when delivering the treatment.  
 
 In terms of the EST criteria, Ost (2008) found that two studies (by Bond and Bunce, 2000; 
Lundgren et al. 2006) had significantly better effects than an active psychotherapy treatment 
condition.  He also found that four other studies (by Bach and Hayes, 2002; Dahl et al. 2002; 
Gratz and Gunderson, 2006; Gregg et al. 2007) were found to be significantly better than a 
treatment as usual (TAU) condition.  However as previously outlined, Ost (2008) found a 
number of methodological problems associated with each of these studies and he therefore 
concludes that the individual studies do not fulfil the EST criteria.        
 





Ost’s (2008) paper reveals that there are significant methodological weaknesses within some 
of the ACT research and he also concludes that in comparison to CBT studies, the ACT RCT 
studies aforementioned employ a research methodology that is significantly less stringent. 
There is substantial evidence within Ost’s (2008) paper to support this finding.  However, one 
of the shortcomings of Ost’s (2008) article is that it fails to take into account that ACT is a 
relatively new form of therapy and, at this stage it has a less well developed research base 
compared to CBT.  One of the possible disadvantages of being a ‘newer form of therapy’ is 
that availability for funding to conduct research may be considerably less.  Ost (2008) 
highlights that the ACT studies had an equal number of grant funded studies as the CBT 
studies but the size of these grants are not detailed in his paper.  Therefore, the conclusions 
drawn from Ost’s (2008) study could potentially be biased if there was a discrepancy in 
funding between the ACT and CBT studies reviewed.  Nevertheless, Ost’s (2008) paper 
highlights to both ACT therapists and ACT researchers potential areas to improve on when 
conducting future research in this area.  
 
The aforementioned studies on cognitive defusion and indeed the ACT RCT studies detailed 
in Ost ‘s (2008) study could be further substantiated by a tool that specifically measures how 
cognitively fused or cognitively defused one is with there thought content.  Within the 
literature there is currently no specific measurement of ACT’s constructs of cognitive fusion 















In recent years other psychological concepts that are related to the construct of cognitive 
defusion have emerged (Safran and Segal, 1990).  Decentering has been defined by Safran 
and Segal (1990) as the ability to “step outside of one’s immediate experience, thereby 
changing the very nature of that experience” (p.117).  It has been conceptualized as the 
ability to observe one’s thoughts and feelings as temporary events in the mind (Fresco, Segal, 
Buis and Kennedy, 2007).   
 
A number of treatments have been developed with a central focus on teaching patients how to 
interact with their thoughts less literally such as metacognitive strategies (Wells, 2000) and 




Meta-cognition is a form of mental processing that can be defined in a number of ways. 
Several researchers have described it as cognitive activity in which other cognitive activities 
are the target of reflection (Yussen, 1985), beliefs and attitudes held about cognition 
(Toneatto, 2002) and the ability to monitor, control, and organize mental activity 
(Shimamura, 1996).  Flavell (1979) defines metacognition as “knowledge and cognition 





about cognitive phenomena” (p.906).  Flavell (1979) distinguished between metacognitive 
knowledge and experience.  He defined metacognitive knowledge as “knowledge or beliefs 
about what factors and variables act and interact in what ways to affect the course and 
outcome of cognitive enterprises” (p.907).  The latter he defines as “any conscious cognitive 
or affective experiences that accompany and pertain to any intellectual enterprise” (p.906).  
Flavell (1979) proposes that the two processes (knowledge and experience) of metacognition 
are not distinct, but are a “partially overlapping set” (p.908). 
 
Teasdale, Moore, Hayhurst et al. (2002) also draw a distinction between metacognitive 
knowledge and metacognitive awareness.  Metacognitive awareness is defined as “the 
process of experiencing negative thoughts and feelings within a decentered perspective” 
(p.276).  The authors refer to this process as the extent to which thoughts are experienced as 
thoughts rather than as aspects of the self or direct reflections of truth.  Metacognitive 
knowledge refers to “beliefs about cognitive phenomena stored in memory as propositional 
facts in much the same way as other fact whereas metacognitive insight refers to actually 




The concept of meta-cognition described above is congruent with the definition of what has 
been referred to as mindfulness (Gardner and Moore, 2007).  Mindfulness has been defined 
as “paying attention in a particular way; on purpose, in the present moment, and non-
judgementally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1994, p.4).  The development of mindfulness entails non-
judgemental and non-evaluative attention to the present reality, which includes both external 





and internal processes.  External and internal events that enter one’s awareness are noticed 
but not evaluated as good, bad, right, wrong, helpful or unhelpful (Kabit-Zinn, 1994).  
Teasdale, Segal and Williams (1995) suggest that the aim is to see thoughts simply as 
thoughts and not absolute realities to which individuals must respond.  The process of 
mindfulness is thought to break down the literal belief in one’s thoughts and internal rules, 
which then enhances the individual’s sensitivity to cues and contingencies in the environment 
(Hayes, Follette and Linehan, 2004).  This heightened sensitivity is considered by the authors 
to lead to greater behavioural flexibility. 
 
There is increasing evidence for the utility of mindfulness training as a clinical intervention.  
As a technique, mindfulness has been used as a component in numerous therapeutic 
interventions targeting a plethora of clinical problems including borderline personality 
disorder (Linehan, 1993), stress and anxiety (Kabat-Zinn, 1990) and recurrent depression 
(Segal et al. 2002).    
 
Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) (Segal et al. 2002) provides evidence that it 
is possible to alter the function of thoughts without first altering their form.  MBCT integrates 
the principles of cognitive therapy with meditative practices and attitudes based on the 
cultivation of mindfulness (Segal et al. 2002).  The authors suggest that when patients with a 
history of relapses into depression are taught to practise mindfulness meditation, these 
patients learn to become aware and identify their negative moods, which for them 
automatically lead to negative thoughts and precipitate relapse.  The goal of MBCT is to 
increase awareness of moment-to-moment experience and to bring attention to the present 





(Williams, Teasdale, Segal and Soulsby, 2000).  The authors suggest that the attitude of non-
judgement and the premise that mental events are only an aspect of the self and not 
synonymous with the self is thought to prevent the escalation of rumination on negative 
thought content.   
 
Research studies within the literature support the use of MBCT.  Two randomised controlled 
clinical trials (Ma and Teasdale, 2004; Teasdale, Segal, Williams, Ridgeway, Soulsby and 
Lau, 2000) support the efficacy of MBCT in preventing depressive relapse.  Teasdale et al. 
(2000) found that MBCT significantly reduced the rates of relapse for individuals who had 
experienced three or more prior episodes of depression, 40% of individuals relapsed in this 
group compared to 66% in the treatment as usual group.  Using identical methodology to 
Teasdale et al’s. (2000) study, Ma and Teasdale (2004) replicated the findings that MBCT 
reduced rates of relapse for individuals with a history of depression.  They found that only 
36% of patients relapsed in the MBCT condition compared to 78% relapse rate of patients in 
the treatment as usual condition. 
 
Teasdale’s Differential Activation Hypothesis (DAH) (Sheppard and Teasdale, 1996; Lau, 
Segal and Williams, 2004) has been put forward to account for the mediating mechanisms in 
MBCT for depression (Segal et al. 2002). The model proposes that transient negative moods 
trigger automatic negative thought patterns, which can spiral and trigger depressive relapse.  
The DAH assumes that while all individuals experience dysphoria when faced with negative 
events, only individuals who are vulnerable to depression will demonstrate changes in 
cognitive functioning. Teasdale (1985) suggests that non-vulnerable individuals are expected 





to demonstrate self-soothing strategies which allow their affect to return to normal levels, 
whereas vulnerable individuals are expected to demonstrate negative cognitive functioning.  
He proposes that in vulnerable individuals, a dysphoric state is predicted to lead to the 
activation of sad-emotion “nodes”, which in turn activates a network of other emotion nodes.  
Teasdale (as cited in Lau, Segal and Williams, 2004) postulates that this network activation is 
then expected to increase the accessibility of sad thoughts and related negative constructs, 
which in turn biases a range of cognitive processes including attention, memory, and future 
expectations. The theory predicts that depressed or sad individuals will remember 
information consistent with their mood.   
 
Hayes and Luoma (2003) acknowledge that decentering, meta-cognitive strategies and 
mindfulness are concepts that are strongly related to the processes underlying cognitive 
defusion.  The authors acknowledge that the exact dividing line, at this stage, remains 
unclear.  Nevertheless, it would seem that the underlying principles of cognitive defusion and 
in particular the concepts of decentering and mindfulness have similar properties and 
functions.  This is captured in the number of related measures that currently exist within the 











1.9 Measures of Constructs Related to Cognitive Defusion 
 
1.9.1 Measure of Acceptance 
 
The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ) developed by Hayes, Strosahl, Wilson et 
al. (2004) incorporates items pertaining to the constructs of cognitive fusion and cognitive 
defusion. 
 
The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ) is currently the only assessment tool that 
measures the construct of experiential avoidance.  The questionnaire is often referred to as a 
single measure of experiential avoidance.  However, the authors propose that the measure 
incorporates a general measure of several ACT processes that target links between 
experiential avoidance and excessively negative evaluations of private experience, inaction, 
literalness of thought and the need for cognitive and emotional control (Hayes et al. 2004; 
Barnes-Holmes, Cochrane, Barnes-Holmes et al. 2004). 
 
There are two validated versions of the AAQ.  Bond and Bunce (2003) developed a 16 item 
version that consists of two factors.  One factor was found to measure acceptance and 
mindfulness and the other factor was found to assess values-based action.  Both factors 
loaded onto a second-order factor, which the authors termed psychological flexibility.  The 
second version of the AAQ consists of ten items and measures the general factor of 
psychological flexibility (Hayes et al. 2004).  Both versions of the AAQ were found to have 
adequate criterion-related, predictive and convergent validities.   
 





There is support within the literature from correlations between the AAQ and a variety of 
other assessment measures.  Hayes et al. (2004) examined the relationship between the AAQ 
and the related concepts using the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI, Wegner and 
Zanakos, 1994), the Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ; Wells and Davies, 1994), the 
Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; Bernstein-Carlson and Putnam, 1986), subscales from 
the Ways of Coping Questionnaire (WOC; Folkman and Lazarus, 1988), the Post-traumatic 
Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa, 1995) and the Impact of Events Scale (IES; Foa, Riggs, 
Dancu & Rothbaum, 1993).  The authors found that the AAQ correlated significantly 
although not strongly with all these measures.  
 
Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda and Lillis (2006) examined the relationship between the AAQ 
and various quality of life questionnaires including psychopathology (e.g., depression, 
anxiety, post-traumatic stress, trichotillomania), stress, pain, job performance and negative 
affectivity.  The authors integrated twenty-seven individual studies, involving 5616 
participants, into a meta-analysis.  Correlations established with a greater number of people 
were given more weight in calculating the average “effect size” using the Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficient (r) as the metric.   The overall data set produced sixty-seven 
correlations between these two sets of variables. The authors found that the weighted effect 
size of these correlations was 0.42 (95% confidence interval: 0.40 – 0.44).   
 
Hayes et al. (2006) also investigated the relationship between the AAQ and the General 
Health Questionnaire (GHQ; Goldberg, 1978).  They combined three studies by Bond and 
Bunce (2000, 2003) and Donaldson-Feilder and Bond (2004) and found that higher levels of 





psychological flexibility were associated with a lower probability of having a psychiatric 
disorder, as measured by the GHQ.  The authors found that the relationship between the AAQ 
and the GHQ was of a medium size: 0.40 (95% confidence interval: 0.34 – 0.45).   
 
In a further examination of the AAQ Hayes et al. (2006) explored the relationship between 
the AAQ with either 1st Version or 2nd Version of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) 
(BDI: Edition 1: Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock and Erbaugh, 1961; Edition 2: Beck, Steer 
and Brown, 1996).  The authors combined eight studies (by Bond and Bunce (2000); Dykstra 
and Follette (1998); Forsyth, Parker and Finlay (2003); Gold, Marx and Lexington, (2007); 
Pistorello (1998); Plumb, Orsillo and Luterek (2004); Polusny, Rosenthal, Aban and Follette 
(2004); Strosahl, Hayes, Bergan and Romano (1998)) and found an effect size of 0.50 (95% 
confidence interval: 0.46 – 0.54) when correlations between depressed mood and 
psychological inflexibility were aggregated in the meta-analysis.    
 
In a further analysis, Hayes et al. (2006) combined three studies by Cook (2004); Polusny, 
Rosenthal, Aban and Follette (2004); Toarmino, Pistorello and Hayes (1997) to investigate 
the association between the AAQ and the Symptom Checklist-90-R (SCL-90R; Derogatis, 
1994), which assesses various indicators of mental ill health.  The authors found that these 
variables produced a large effect size of 0.53 (95% confidence interval: 0.47 – 0.58).   
 
Bond and Bunce (2003) examined the longitudinal effects of psychological acceptance on 
mental health, job satisfaction and work performance amongst four hundred and twelve 
customer service centre employees in a UK financial organization.   As measured on the 16-





item AAQ, the authors found that higher levels of acceptance predicted better mental health 
and improved job performance.   
 
Ossman, Wilson, Storaasli and McNeill (2006) examined the impact of a group treatment 
protocol based on ACT for socially anxious persons.  Of the twenty-two participants in the 
group treatment, which consisted of ten sessions, twelve participants completed the treatment.  
Using the Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory (SPAI; Turner, Beidel and Dancu, 1996; 
Turner, Beidel and Stanley, 1989) and the AAQ, Ossman et al. (2006) found significant 
decreases on both measures at post-treatment and follow-up.  More specifically, they found 
that participants who had completed the group treatment had significantly higher ratings of 
effectiveness in living, specifically pertaining to social relationships, at follow-up.  They also 
found that participant symptoms decreased despite not being treatment targets.  The authors 
account for this by suggesting that symptom improvement may result from an increased 
willingness to both experience aversive emotions and engage in social behaviours that are 
consistent with what the participants valued but previously avoided.  There are several 
limitations to the above study.  The authors do not explain why one participant declined 
treatment and nor do they explain why nine participants dropped out of treatment.  It would 
appear that the authors made no attempt to explore the reasons as to why those participants 
did not wish to continue with the treatment.  The reduction in participant numbers has a 
significant impact on the sample size and it is arguable whether the authors can derive any 
conclusive findings from this research.  The absence of a formal control group is also 
questionable.  
 





However, when reviewing the content of the AAQ it is clear that while some of the questions 
make reference to Hayes et al’s. (1999) construct of cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion, 
the questionnaire does not reflect the constructs as a whole.   
 
1.9.2 Measures of Meta-cognition 
 
There are currently three measures that assess meta-cognitive processes.  Cartwright-Hatton 
and Wells (1997) developed the Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (MCQ), a self-report 
measure to assess beliefs about worry.  The MCQ is a 65 item scale which assesses five 
factors.  The first one (positive beliefs about worrying) include items about beneficial 
outcomes of worrying for planning and problem solving (i.e. “worrying helps me to avoid a 
disastrous situation” or “worrying helps me to plan the future more effectively”.  The second 
factor reflects the belief that worry must be controlled along with the belief about the 
uncontrollability of worry.  Items include “I find it difficult to control my thoughts” or 
“worrying thoughts enter my head against my will”.  The third factor is linked to a lack of 
cognitive confidence for one’s memory and attentional abilities.  A sample of the items 
include “my memory can mislead me at times” or “I have difficulty keeping my mind focused 
on one thing for a long time”.  The fourth factor is related to negative beliefs about worry 
concerning the uncontrollability and danger of thoughts (i.e. “if I did not control a worrying 
thought, and then it happened, it would be my fault” or “I could be punished for having 
certain thoughts”.  The fifth factor is related to cognitive self-consciousness.  Items include “I 
think a lot about my thoughts” or “I pay close attention to the way my mind works”.  The 
internal reliability of the MCQ ranges from .72 (factor 5) to .89 (factor 2).  The inter-





correlations between the factors ranged from r = .08 to r = .43.  The test-retest reliability of 
the total scale at five weeks was very high, r = .94.   
 
The Metacognitive Awareness Questionnaire (MAQ) was developed by Teasdale, Scott, 
Moore, Hayhurst, Pope and Paykel (2001).  The MAQ is a 9-item scale that was developed 
for patients to report whether or not they saw their negative thoughts and feelings when 
depressed as reflecting actual realities.  Items from the MAQ include “I can’t trust my 
judgements about myself when I feel down”, “When I am depressed, I am aware that there 
could be other ways of viewing the situation” and “When something has upset me, I try to put 
my judgements on hold for a while”.  Responses range from 1 to 7 )1 = totally agree; 7 = 
totally disagree), and higher scores reflect greater metacognitive awareness.  The Cronbach’s 
alpha for the scale indicated .71.   
 
The Meta-cognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI) developed by Schraw and Dennison, (1994) 
is a 52-item inventory that measures adults’ meta-cognitive awareness.  The scale consists of 
two categories, knowledge of cognition and regulation of cognition.  Knowledge about 
cognition includes three subprocesses “declarative knowledge (i.e., knowledge about the self 
and about strategies), procedural knowledge (i.e., knowledge about how to use strategies) and 
conditional knowledge (i.e., knowledge about when and why to use strategies)” (Schraw and 
Dennison, 1994, p.460).  Regulation of cognition includes planning, information management 
strategies, comprehension monitoring, debugging strategies and evaluation (Schraw and 
Dennison, 1994). Items from the knowledge of cognition subscale include “I find myself 
using helpful learning strategies automatically”, “I learn more when I am interested in the 





topic” and “I use different learning strategies depending on the situation”.  Items from the 
regulation of cognition include “I set specific goals before I begin a task”, “I draw pictures or 
diagrams to help me understand while learning”, “I consider several alternatives to a 
problem before I answer”, “I ask myself if there was an easier way to do things after I finish a 
task” and “I re-evaluate my assumptions when I get confused”.  The Cronbach’s alpha for the 
scale was .90.   
 
Further questionnaires measuring the concept of decentering have also been developed that 
bear resemblance to the construct of cognitive defusion. 
 
1.9.3 Measures of Decentering (Mindfulness) 
 
More recently, several questionnaires have been developed that incorporate themes of 
decentering from thoughts and feelings. 
 
The Experiences Questionnaire (EQ) developed by Fresco, Moore, Dulmen et al. (2007) was 
designed as a practical measure of the primary psychotherapy process in MBCT.  The authors 
refer to the EQ as a self-report questionnaire designed to measure both decentering and 
rumination in the context of mood disorders.  The authors derived an eleven item decentering 
factor using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis in two consecutive large samples of 
college students.  The factor structure was further confirmed in a sample of patients with 
remitted depressive disorder.  Sample items from the EQ include “I can observe unpleasant 
feelings without being drawn into them” and “I am better able to accept myself as I am” The 
measure showed good internal consistency, ranging from .81 to .90.   





The Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire (SMQ) developed by Chadwick, Hember, 
Symes, Peters, Kuipers and Dagnan (2008) was designed to measure the relationship between 
distressing thoughts and images that are central to the phenomena found in clinical disorders 
(see p.68 for further information about the psychometric properties of the questionnaire).  
  
1.9.4 Summary of Measures Related to the Construct of Cognitive Defusion 
 
While it is clear that the aforementioned measures clearly relate to some of the principles 
underlying the construct of cognitive defusion, it is also apparent that the measures do not 
fully capture the constructs of cognitive fusion or cognitive defusion as defined by Hayes et 
al. 1999).  The AAQ (Hayes et al. 2004) includes some items pertaining to both constructs.  
However the questionnaire predominantly targets ACT’s constructs of acceptance and 
experiential avoidance.  The MCQ (Cartwright-Hatton and Well’s, 1997) is a measure that 
assesses meta-cognitive belief but it is specific to generalized anxiety disorder.  While the 
MAQ (Teasdale et al. 2001) assesses awareness of cognition, the scale is specific to 
depression.  The MAI (Schraw and Dennison, 1994) is pertains to learning performance.  The 
EQ (Fresco et al. 2007) captures the concept of decentering from thoughts and rumination in 
the context of mood disorders but the measure has been predominantly developed to measure 
the effectiveness of MBCT.  Finally, the SMQ (Chadwick et al. 2008) primarily assesses 
mindful relating to psychotic phenomenon particularly voices.  While the above measures are 
similar to Hayes et al. (2006) constructs of cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion, the 
questionnaires do not adequately assess these constructs.  In addition there is need for a 
generic measure that can be used across any adult populations for individuals either suffering 
from or without psychological disorders. 





1.10 The Present Study 
 
The present study describes the development and evaluation of a self-administered pencil and 
paper questionnaire to measure Acceptance and Commitment Therapy’s constructs of 
cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion.  There would be numerous benefits to creating such 
a valid and reliable tool.  From a psychometric standpoint it would be useful to have a 
measure that can isolate constructs that address the aspects of cognitive fusion and cognitive 
defusion identified by Hayes et al. (1999).  As cognitive fusion has been postulated as a 
factor in psychopathological processes, it appears useful to have a questionnaire that 
measures this directly.  The questionnaire could be used in clinical practice to determine how 
cognitively fused or cognitively defused one is with their mental content.  The development 
of such a measure could be used as a pre and post therapy tool to measure the effectiveness of 
ACT and other therapies including MBCT, CT and REBT to name but a few.  The tool could 
be used in future research to develop the research base on cognitive fusion and cognitive 
defusion because at present research focusing solely on this construct is relatively sparse.  
Finally, by creating such a measure and establishing the measure to be both reliable and valid 
will further serve to increase the theoretical structure of ACT, in particular the area of 












1.11 Research Aims and Hypotheses 
 
1.11.1 Research Aims 
 
The aim of the research was to create a valid and reliable tool that accurately measures the 
constructs of cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion.  To date, as far as the researcher is 
aware there, is no well-validated tool to identify these constructs. The study evaluated the 
psychometric properties of the 42-item pool (CFQ).   
 
The study examined the validity of the CFQ. The study tested content and construct validity 
associated with the questionnaire.  Content validity refers to the extent to which the items in a 
scale sample the universe of behaviours that the test is designed to sample (Guion, 1980).  
This aspect of validity was evaluated by inspecting the range of items that significantly 
loaded on the factor or factors (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955).  Content validity was also 
evaluated in the construction of the questionnaire.  The researcher collaborated with and 
sought opinions from experts in the field of ACT in the development of items for the scale.     
 
Construct validity refers to the extent to which the instrument measures what it purports to 
measure (Guion, 1980).  Construct validity is measured through convergent and divergent 
validity of a scale.  A scale demonstrates convergent validity if it is related to an alternative 
measure of the same or similar construct (Guion, 1980).  Divergent validity is shown when a 
scale is poorly related to measures of dissimilar constructs.  Convergent validity of the CFQ 
was examined by the patterns of correlations between the CFQ and participant responses to 
measure of life satisfaction, a measure of experiential avoidance, a measure concerning 





individual’s beliefs about worry and a questionnaire measuring mindful responding to 
























1.11.2 Research Hypotheses  
 
 Hypothesis One - It was expected that those participants that are more fused as measured 
on the CFQ would have lower levels of life satisfaction as measured by the Dieners 
Satisfactions with Life Scale (SWLS) (Diener, Emmons, Larsen and Griffin, 1985) 
compared to participants who have low levels of cognitive fusion.    
 
 Hypothesis Two - It was also expected that participants that are more fused would score 
higher on avoidance as measured by the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II) 
(Hayes et al. 2004).   
 
 Hypothesis Three – It was expected that participants with higher levels of cognitive 
fusion would score higher on the TCQ (Wells and Davis, 1994).   
 
 Hypothesis Four - It was expected that participants that are less fused would score higher 
on the SMQ (Chadwick et al. 2008). 
 
 





2 CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Design 
 
A cross sectional research design was employed in Study One and Study Two.  The purpose 
of the research was to develop a scale to measure Hayes et al’s. (1999) constructs of 
cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion.  For the purposes of Study One and Study Two all 
participants completed the questionnaires once.  
 
2.1.1 Construction of the CFQ 
 
A pool of 44 items was drawn from reading about the constructs of cognitive fusion and 
cognitive defusion, from clinical experience and from (Continuing Professional Development 
(CPD)) courses in ACT.  Close attention was paid to the “basic principles of item writing”, as 
outlined by Clark and Watson (1995, p.312).  Particular focus was placed on simple, 
straightforward language, exact phrasing of items and the avoidance of “double barrelled” 
items (Clark and Watson, 1995, p.312) that might assess more than one construct.  Members 
of the ACT Special Interest Branch of the BABCP and the local ACT Interest Group were 
consulted and asked to review the initial questionnaire.  See appendix 1 for a list of the initial 
items and the initial questionnaire.  Eleven members of the ACT Special Interest Branch of 
the BABCP and three members of the local ACT Interest Group were invited to rate items for 
representativeness of the constructs of cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion on a four point 
Likert scale ranging from “not at all”, “a little”, “moderately” and “highly”.  All of the 
people consulted were ACT therapists and researchers with considerable training and 
experience in ACT.  Of the fourteen members consulted, nine members responded with 
individual ratings and qualitative comments.  Collectively, the qualitative comments made 





reference to the wording of several of the items and the conceptualisation of some of the 
items.  
 
Individual item ratings of representativeness were entered into an SPSS 13 Database for 
exploration.  The data’s frequencies, means and modes were examined.  Individual items that 
were rated as either a 3 “moderately” or 4 “highly” were selected first.  Five items met this 
criteria.  The items are listed below, 
 
10. “I tell myself that I shouldn’t be thinking the way I’m thinking” 
15. “I make judgements about whether my thoughts are good or bad” 
16. “I think some thoughts are bad and inappropriate” 
19. “I get upset with myself for having certain thoughts” 
21. “I feel like my thoughts need to change before I can have a good life” 
  
Items that had a mean rating of 3.5 or above (indicating a mean high level of agreement) were 
then examined.  Eight items met this criterion.  The items are listed below, 
 
10. “I tell myself that I shouldn’t be thinking the way I’m thinking” 
13. “I get very caught up in my thought processes” 
15. “I make judgements about whether my thoughts are good or bad” 
16. “I think some thoughts are bad and inappropriate” 
19. “I get upset with myself for having certain thoughts” 
21. “I feel like my thoughts need to change before I can have a good life” 
24. “I tend to get very entangled in my thoughts” 





41. “I see my thoughts as facts” 
 
An examination of the items that had a modal rating of 4 (indicating that the majority of 
raters thought that the item was highly representative) were then explored.  This generated 
fifteen items.  The items are as follows, 
 
3. “My thoughts cause me distress or emotional pain” 
4. “Even when my mind is going over and over the same thing, I  
understand that thoughts are just thoughts”  
7. “I place great importance on my thoughts” 
10. “I tell myself that I shouldn’t be thinking the way I’m thinking” 
12. “I am able to distance myself from my thoughts as I know that they will become 
less important eventually” 
13. “I get very caught up in my thought processes” 
14. “I can see that my thoughts are just thoughts” 
15. “I make judgements about whether my thoughts are good or bad” 
19. “I get upset with myself for having certain thoughts” 
20. “I find it difficult to ignore certain thoughts” 
24. “I tend to get very entangled in my thoughts”  
25. “I am able to stand back from thought processes that are overwhelming” 
27. “Even when I’m upset I am able to see that some thoughts may not be true” 
40. “My thoughts just come and go and I’m not too attached to them” 
41. “I see my thoughts as facts” 
 





Items that had a modal rating of 3 or 4 (indicating that the majority of raters considered the 
items to be moderately or highly representative of cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion) 
were then examined.  Thirty two items met this criteria.  The items are as follows, 
 
1. “I get so caught up in my thoughts that I don’t see other people’s point of view” 
3. “My thoughts cause me distress or emotional pain” 
4. “Even when my mind is going over and over the same thing, I understand that 
thoughts are just thoughts” 
5. “Even when I am mistaken about a situation, I find it hard to let go of how I’m 
thinking about it” 
7. “I place great importance on my thoughts” 
8. “I find it hard to get things out of my mind” 
10. “I tell myself that I shouldn’t be thinking the way I’m thinking” 
12. “I am able to distance myself from my thoughts as I know that  
they will become less important eventually” 
13. “I get very caught up in my thought processes” 
14. “I can see that my thoughts are just thoughts” 
15. “I make judgements about whether my thoughts are good or bad” 
16. “I think some thoughts are bad and inappropriate” 
19. “I get upset with myself for having certain thoughts” 
20. “I find it difficult to ignore certain thoughts” 
21. “I feel like my thoughts need to change before I can have a good life” 
23. “I am able to move on from my thoughts” 
24. “I tend to get very entangled in my thoughts” 
25. “I am able to stand back from thought processes that are overwhelming” 





26. “I am able to move on from certain thoughts relatively easily” 
27. “Even when I’m upset I am able to see that some thoughts may not be true” 
30. “When I find myself dwelling on things, I am able to move on relatively quickly” 
31. “I do not brood over past events” 
32. “I do not grasp on to my thoughts and pick them apart” 
36. “I spend very little time analysing situations” 
37. “My thoughts must be right before I act” 
38. “I find it easy to switch off from my thoughts” 
39. “I find it easy to view my thoughts from different angles” 
40. “My thoughts just come and go and I’m not too attached to them” 
41. “I see my thoughts as facts” 
42. “There are certain areas in my life where my thoughts are rigid or inflexible” 
  43. “I never act against my thoughts” 
44. “I very rarely get caught up in thinking” 
 
The qualitative responses were then examined.  Items 5, 12, 25, 30, 31, 39 and 41 were 
reworded to clarify the items conceptual clarity.  The items reworded are as follows,   
 
5. “It’s such a struggle to let go of upsetting thoughts even when I know that letting go 
would be helpful” translates as item 14 on the F-42 (see Appendix 2)  
12. “Even when I am having distressing thoughts, I know that they may become less 
important eventually” translates as item 3 on the F-42 (see Appendix 2) 
25. “I am able to stand back from thoughts that are overwhelming me” translates as 
item 27 on the F-42 (see Appendix 2) 
 





30. “When I catch myself dwelling on things, I am able to let go of dwelling relatively 
quickly” translates as item 36 on the F-42 (see Appendix 2) 
31. “I brood over past events” translates as item 37 on the F-42 (see Appendix 2) 
39. “I find it easy to view my thoughts from a different perspective” translates as item 
9 on the F-42 (see Appendix 2) 
41. “My thoughts are facts” translates as item 13 on the F-42 (see Appendix 2) 
 
It was also agreed that items 13 and 24 were too similar.  As item 24 was rated as more 
representative, an agreement was reached that item 13 would be omitted on the grounds of 
repetition.  The decision was reached to omit item 4 and item 14 because one member of the 
Expert Reference Group suggested that from his experience on developing the Acceptance 
and Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Hayes et al. 2004), items such as “thoughts are just 
thoughts” were not responded to in a reliable way by participants and showed low validity in 
terms of low factor loadings (Personal Communication with F. Bond 17th April 2008).  It was 
proposed that the concept would be too alien for many people.  Items 1, 7, 8, 20, 23, 26, 27, 
32, 36, 37, 38, 42, 43, and 44 were also omitted as they were considered to be conceptually 
unclear. 
 
After considering the qualitative comments that were received from members of the Expert 
Reference Group, the decision was reached to include the following items below even though 
they had not appeared in our initial analysis. 
 
17. “I over-analyse situations to the point where it’s unhelpful to me” 
33. “My mind is capable of having upsetting thoughts, but I can live with them” 





During the item development stage it became apparent that a similar research project was 
occurring for an MPhil at the University of Southampton.  The researcher and her Academic 
Supervisor collaborated and shared items with the other researchers and the researcher agreed 
to incorporate some of the other researcher’s items in this study.  The decision was reached to 
combine twenty-four items with the aforementioned items.  The items selected were, 
 
4. “I find myself preoccupied with the future or the past” 
6. “Even when I’m having upsetting thoughts, I can see that those thoughts may not be 
literally true” 
12. “I do not over-analyse my thoughts” 
16. “I get so caught up in my thoughts that I am unable to do the things that  I most 
want to do” 
18. “I can watch my thoughts from a distance without getting caught up in them” 
19. “There are certain areas in my life where my thoughts are rigid or inflexible” 
20. “I get so caught up in my thoughts that I don’t see other people’s point of view” 
21. “I am able to do what’s important in my life even when I have upsetting thoughts” 
22. “I struggle with my thoughts” 
23. “I am my thoughts” 
24. “I can be aware of my thoughts without necessarily reacting to them” 
25. “I take the content of my thoughts to be the truth” 
26. “If I think I cannot do something then I will not try to do it” 
28. “I get so caught up in my thoughts that I forget what I’m actually doing” 
29. “I tend to react very strongly to my thoughts” 
30. “I am able to move on from troubling thoughts relatively easily” 
31. “My thoughts are who I am” 





32. “I believe the thoughts that pop into my head” 
34. “I need to control the thoughts that come into my head” 
35. “Once I’ve thought about something upsetting its difficult for me to focus on 
anything else” 
38. “I can do difficult things even if my thoughts say they are impossible to do” 
 39. “I can think about something stressful without getting stressed” 
 40. “There is more to me than my thoughts” 
42. “Its possible for me to have negative thoughts about myself and still know that I 
am an OK person” 
  
Final visual inspection of the questionnaire revealed that nothing was tapping into future 
cognitive fusion or worry.  The following item was therefore added to the questionnaire, 
  
41. “I worry a great deal” 
 
Every third item on the scale was included as a cognitive defusion item and the other items 
cognitive fusion items.  This was done to try and balance the cognitive fusion and cognitive 
defusion items and to make scoring of the questionnaire easier. 
 
The final scale therefore consisted of 42 items (16 cognitive defusion items and 26 cognitive 
fusion items).  A Likert scale was adopted because of ease of construction, intuitive appeal, 
adaptability and usually good reliability (Babbie, 1998; Nunnally, 1978).  Items were rated on 
a 7-point Likert Scale (1 = ‘never true’; 2 = ‘very seldom true’; 3 = seldom true’; 4 = 





‘sometimes true’; 5 = ‘frequently true’; 6 = ‘almost always true’; 7 = ‘always true’) for 
suitability.   
 
Agreement with a positively stated proposition is hypothesized to reveal the underlying 
construct.  The decision was reached to name the scale the ‘Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire’ 
(CFQ – 42 items).  See appendix 2 to review the scale. 
 
2.2 Sample Size Estimations 
 
2.2.1 Study 1 
 
Sample size is important for all studies but it has particular impact upon factor analysis. 
Within the literature, a wide range of recommendations regarding sample size in factor 
analysis have been made.  Comrey and Lee (as cited in MacCallum et al. 1999, p.84) propose 
the following guidance rules on sample size: 100 = poor, 200 = fair, 300 = good, 500 = very 
good, 1,000 or more = excellent.  They further suggested that researchers, whenever possible, 
should aim to obtain samples of 500 or more observations.  Gorsuch (as cited in MacCallum 
et al. 1999) recommend five subjects per item, with at least 100 subjects. MacCallum, 
Widaman, Zhang and Hong (1999) suggest that these recommendations are usually stated in 
terms of either the minimum sample size (N) for a particular analysis or the minimum ratio of 
N to the number of variables, p (i.e. the number of survey items being subjected to factor 
analysis).  Guilford (as cited in MacCallum et al. 1999) suggest that N should be no less than 
200 cases while Cattle (as cited in MacCallum et al. 1999) claimed the minimum desirable N 
to be 250.  Lawley and Maxwell (1963) suggest fifty-one more cases than the number of 
variables.   





When reviewing the second recommendation (i.e. the subjects-to-variables (STV) ratio, 
Everitt (1975) propose that there should be at least ten cases for each item in the instrument 
being used.  Bryant and Yarnold (as cited in Grimm & Yarnold, 1995) and Gorsuch (1983) 
suggest that the STV should be no lower than five.  Cattell (1978) recommends three to six 
subjects per item. Others have suggested five or ten times the number of observed variables 
(Fayers and Machin, 2007).  
 
Froman (2001) proposes that in factor analysis, small sample sizes are likely to yield spurious 
results that elude replication.  The author suggests that this occurs in two forms that are 
informally referred to as “rogue” or “splinter” factors.  Rogue factors are defined as those 
factors that are specific to one data set that may result from bias in a small sample limiting 
how representative it is of the larger population (Froman, 2001).  Splinter factors are viewed 
as smaller groupings of items that constitute a larger factor that has “splintered” when tested 
on a small sample.  The author argues that having a sufficiently large sample helps to avoid 
rogue and splinter factors.   
  
In support of this, MacCallum et al. (1999) suggest that as the sample size increases, 
sampling error is reduced, factor analysis solutions become more stable and more reliably 
produce the factorial structure of the population.  Costello and Osborne (2005) empirically 
tested the effect of sample size on the results of factor analysis.  They found that larger 
samples tended to produce more accurate solutions.   
 





When reviewing the above it would appear that there are no definitive guidelines about how 
big a sample size must be to produce meaningful factor analysis.  Based on scientific and 
pragmatic concerns, the researcher decided the number of participants based on Bryant and 
Yarnold (as cited in Grimm & Yarnold, 1995) and Gorsuch (1983) suggestion that the STV 
should be no lower than 5.  Therefore, the number of participants needed, was calculated as 
five times the number of observed items (i.e. 42) in the questionnaire.  The researcher needed 
to obtain a minimum of 210 participants. According to Comrey and Lee’s (as cited in 
MacCallum et al. 1999,p.84) guidance rules a sample size of 210 would be categorised as 
“fair”.  
 
2.2.2 Study 2 
 
Principal Component Analysis was used in study 2 to further establish the structural validity 
of the CFQ.  The above sample size requirements were utilized in study 2.  The researcher 
adopted Bryant and Yarnold (1995) and Gorsuch’s (1983) suggestion that the STV should be 
no lower than 5.  The number of participants needed, was calculated as five times the number 
of observed variables (i.e. 28) in the questionnaire.  Therefore, the researcher needed to 
obtain a minimum of 140 participants.   
 
The purpose of study 2 was also to establish the external validity component of the CFQ.  
Correlational analysis with comparison measures were utilized for this purpose. The 
necessary sample size calculation was based on Cohen’s (1992) recommendations for 
correlation.  The sample size calculation estimated to detect medium size correlations with 
80% power at the 5% significance level was 45 participants.  







2.3.1 Study 1; Undergraduate and Postgraduate Student Cohort; Adult Participants 
 
This group comprised Undergraduate Psychology students and Postgraduate Clinical 
Psychology students studying at Edinburgh University and a community sample.  The 
community sample was invited to participate by virtue of there being colleagues and friends 
of the researcher.  The researcher distributed questionnaires to her acquaintances who, in 
turn, invited their friends and family to participate.  This method is often referred to as 
‘snowball sampling’ (Goodman, 1961).  A total of 425 individuals took part in study 1.  The 
participant’s ages ranged from 17 to over 55.  In total, 283 females and 142 males 
participated in study 1.  
 
2.3.2 Study 2; Undergraduate Student Cohort and Postgraduate Student Cohort 
This group comprised Undergraduate Psychology students and Postgraduate Clinical 
Psychology Students studying at Edinburgh University.  In both samples a different set of 
participants were selected from study 1.  A total of 167 individuals took part in study 2.  The 
participants’ ages ranged from 17 to 44. In total, 135 females and 32 males participated in 
study 2.  
 
2.3.3 Participant Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
 
 No inclusion and exclusion criteria set for both studies.  
The researcher based this decision on the fact that she was selecting healthy participants from 
the general population (i.e. from non-clinical populations).  As the majority of the 





participants in both studies were selected from University populations, it was presumed that 
participants were fluent in reading English.  It was also presumed that participants would not 
have a recognized learning disability and thus their ability to comprehend the questions being 




2.4.1 Study 1 
Participants in this group were invited to complete two self-report pencil and paper 
questionnaires on one occasion only: These were as follows;  
 A Demographic Questionnaire 
 CFQ (CFQ) (42 Items) 
 
2.4.2 Study 2 
Participants in this group were invited to complete six self-report pencil and paper 
questionnaires on one occasion only: These were as follows; 
 A Demographic Questionnaire 
 CFQ (CFQ) (28 Items) 
 The Southampton Mindfulness Scale (SMQ) Chadwick, Hember, Symes, Peters, 
Kuipers and Dagnan, 2008).   
 The Dieners Satisfactions with Life Scale (SWLS) (Diener, Emmons, Larsen and 
Griffin, 1985).   
 The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II) (Hayes, Strosahl, Wilson et al. 
(2004).   





 The Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ) (Wells and Davis, 1994) Wells and Davis, 
1994) 
Apart from the aforementioned CFQ these measures will now be discussed in more detail. 
 
2.4.3 Demographic Questionnaire (See Appendix 3) 
 
A specific demographic questionnaire was developed for this study.  Participants were invited 
to complete the brief questionnaire which asked for information regarding gender and age.  
 
2.4.4 The Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire (SMQ) (Chadwick, Hember, 
Symes et al. 2008) (See Appendix 4)  
The Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire (SMQ) consists of 16 items rated on a 7-point 
scale (7 = Agree Totally, 1 = Disagree Totally).  The SMQ assesses mindful responding to 
unpleasant thoughts and images. Chadwick et al. (2008) examined the reliability and validity 
of the SMQ in a community sample of meditators (n = 83) and non-meditators (n = 51). The 
authors reported good internal consistency for the SMQ (alpha = .89), a statistically 
significant correlation (r = .57) with the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS: Brown 
and Ryan, 2003), statistically significant differences in the expected direction between 
meditators and nonmeditators (t = 3.40, df = 132, p = .001), statistically significant 
correlations with mood ratings, and sensitivity to increase in mindfulness over a Mindfulness 
Based Stress Reduction (MBSR: Kabat-Zinn, 1990) based training programme for 20 health 
professionals. The psychometric properties of the SMQ have been further assessed by Baer, 
Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer and Toney (2006).  In their sample of 613 undergraduates, the 





SMQ revealed good internal reliability (alpha = 0.85) and was statistically significantly 
positively correlated in all directions with all other mindfulness measures. 
 
2.4.5 The Dieners Satisfactions with Life Scale (SWLS) (Diener, Emmons, Larsen and 
Griffin, 1985). (See Appendix 5) 
The Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS) is a global measure of life satisfaction and consists 
of 5-items that are completed by the individual whose life satisfaction is being measured.  
Items in the SWLS are rated on a 7-point scale and include items such as “In most ways my 
life is close to my ideal” and “If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing”. 
The items are summed to yield a domain satisfaction composite score.  Diener et al. (1985) 
indicate that scores between 30-35 indicate high satisfaction, scores between 25-29 indicate 
that the individual likes their life and feels that things are going well, scores between 20-24 
indicate average life satisfaction, scores between 15-19 indicate slightly below average life 
satisfaction, scores between 10-14 state dissatisfaction and finally scores between 5-9 
indicate extreme dissatisfaction.  Diener et al. (1985) reported a two month test-retest 
correlation coefficient of .82 and an alpha coefficient of .87 for a sample of 176 
undergraduates.  
 
2.4.6 The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II) (Hayes, Strosahl, Wilson et 
al. (2004).  (See Appendix 6) 
The AAQ-II is a 10-item inventory rated on a 7-point scale (1=never true, 7=always true) that 
assesses the construct of psychological flexibility.  Items include “It seems like most people 
are handling their lives better than I am” and “I worry about not being able to control my 





worries and feelings”.  High scores on the AAQ-II are reflective of greater experiential 
avoidance and difficulty in taking action when confronted by difficult private experiences 
such as thoughts, memories, feelings and urges, while low scores reflect greater acceptance 
and action.  Across seven samples (five ‘normal’ samples of people and two samples of 
people seeking treatment for substance misuse) with a total of 3300 participants the AAQ-II 
was found to have an adequate structure and good reliability and validity (Hayes et al. 2004).  
The reliability of the AAQ-II across the seven samples had a mean alpha coefficient of .83 
(ranging from .76 to .87) and a three and twelve month test-retest reliability of r = .80 and r = 
.78 respectively (Hayes et al. 2004).  The AAQ-II has also been shown to have substantial 
incremental and criterion related validity (Hayes et al. 2004).  
 
2.4.7 The Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ) Wells and Davis, 1994). (See 
Appendix 7) 
The Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ) is designed to measure various techniques that 
individuals use to control unpleasant and unwanted thoughts.  The questionnaire consists of 
30 items rated on a 4-point scale (1 = Never, 4 = almost always).  The TCQ is a five factor 
instrument that measures individual differences in strategies that people use to try and control 
unwanted distressing thoughts.  These strategies include distraction, worry, punishment, 
social control, and reappraisal.  Each factor has six items per strategy.  The measure requires 
one to answer about the techniques they generally use to control unpleasant and/or unwanted 
thoughts on a four point rating scale ranging from “never” to “almost always”.  Sample items 
include “I occupy myself with work instead” (distraction), “I ask my friends if they have 
similar thoughts” (social control), “I focus on different negative thoughts” (worry), “I punish 
myself for thinking the thought” (punishment) and finally “I question reasons for having the 





thought” (reappraisal).  Internal consistency was found to be acceptable (a = .64 for 
punishment, a = .67 for reappraisal) to good (a = .72 for distraction, a = .79 for social control 
and a = .71 for worry) (Wells and Davis, 1994).  Test-retest reliability (six weeks) ranged 
from, r = .67 for punishment to r = .83 for social control (Wells and Davis. 1994).   
 
2.5 Ethical Approval  
 
Ethical approval was granted by the North of Scotland Research Ethics Committee on 26th 
May 2008 (See Appendix 8).  Approval was also given by the Grampian Research and 
Development Committee on 20th June 2008 (See Appendix 9).  As my research required me 
to recruit Undergraduate students, I had to apply for ethical approval via the University of 
Edinburgh Psychology Department.  I approached the Head of Department and outlined the 
aims of my study.  I was required to complete an application in order to recruit the 
undergraduate students.   After completing an ethics form and submitting the necessary 
documentation, I was granted Ethical approval on (23rd September 2008) (See Appendix 10).  
Ethical approval was also sought to recruit Postgraduate Clinical Psychology students via the 
School of Health and Social Science at Edinburgh University.  This involved the researcher 
completing a further ethics form.  After submitting the required documentation I was granted 
ethical approval on 3rd March 2008.  
 
2.6 Ethical Considerations 
 
While the above study did not require the informed consent of participants due to the study 
entailing the use of anonymous questionnaires where participants would not be personally 





identifiable, the researcher was aware of other potential shortcomings and ethical 
considerations.   
 
All participants were explicitly informed that participation was entirely voluntary.  
Participants sampled from the University population who did not wish to take part in the 
study were told that their decision to do so would have no bearing on their University course 
credits.  Furthermore, to ensure that participants selected from the University sample did not 
feel in anyway coerced to participate in the study, a ballot box procedure was adopted in both 
studies.   
 
It was not anticipated that the questionnaires used in this research would cause distress.  
However, if an individual did become unexpectedly distressed, participants were informed to 
cease completion of the questionnaires.  The opportunity was offered to all participants to 
contact the primary researcher and/or her academic supervisor to discuss any difficulty they 
encountered or indeed to ask about any aspect of the study.  Individuals were verbally told of 
this protocol and further information pertaining to this was provided on the Participant 




The present research was conducted in two stages.  Each stage will be referred to as “Study 
1” and “Study 2”.  
 





2.7.1 Study 1 
 
The researcher attended undergraduate and postgraduate lectures.  Participants were told by 
the researcher that the study was being conducted to develop a questionnaire measuring the 
constructs of cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion.  They were also informed that their 
participation was completely voluntary, anonymous and confidential.   
 
The questionnaire package contained an information sheet (See Appendix 11) that stated the 
purpose of the study and a statement indicating that a summary of the findings of the study 
would be available in February 2009 for interested participants; and they had the right to 
withdraw at any time.  In addition, any individuals who became distressed as a result of 
completing the questionnaires were asked to contact the researcher.  The information sheet 
and two questionnaires in paper format were distributed before and after the lecture.  
Participants were invited to complete the questionnaires and to put the questionnaires in a box 
that was left in the lecture theatre.  The researcher collected the questionnaires at a later date.  
Implicit consent was given by those individuals who completed and returned the 
questionnaires.   
 
The researcher also decided to use the internet site www.surveymonkey.com to create an 
online version of the questionnaires. The aim of this was twofold: to yield a higher response 
rate and to use less paper.  The researcher paid a subscription fee of approximately £15.00 per 
month to advertise the questionnaires.  This ensured that participants could complete the 
questionnaires in an environment of their choice thus choosing their own level of privacy.  





Participants were given two months to respond.  Implicit consent was given by those 
individuals who completed the online questionnaires. 
 
2.7.2 Study 2 
 
The researcher attended undergraduate lectures and postgraduate lectures.  Participants were 
told by the researcher that the study being conducted was the second study in a two-part 
research project to develop a questionnaire to measure the constructs of cognitive fusion and 
cognitive defusion.  The participants were informed that their participation was completely 
voluntary, anonymous and confidential.   
 
The questionnaire package contained an information sheet (See Appendix 12) that stated the 
purpose of the study and a statement indicating that a summary of the findings of the study 
would be available in February 2009 for interested participants.  The information sheet 
highlighted to all participants that they had the right to withdraw at anytime.  In addition, any 
individuals who became distressed as a result of completing the questionnaires were asked to 
contact the researcher.  Participants were presented with an information sheet outlining the 
nature of the study.  Participants were asked to complete six questionnaires and to put the 
questionnaires in a box that was left in the lecture theatre.  The researcher collected the 
questionnaires at a later date.  Dr David Gillanders (Academic Supervisor) also advertised the 
study in two Trainee Clinical Psychology lectures at Edinburgh University.  The same box 
procedure was also adopted in this situation.  Implicit consent was given by those individuals 
who completed and returned the questionnaires.  
 





2.8 Confidentiality  
 
No identifying information was obtained from participants in Study 1 or Study 2. 
  
2.9 Analytic Plan  
 
Data were analysed using SPSS for Windows (Version 14.0). The methods of statistical 
analysis was Principal Component Analysis and correlational analysis.  An outline of the 
statistical procedures and reasons for their selection are provided below. 
 
2.9.1 Study 1 
 
2.9.1.1 Factor Analysis (Principal Component Analysis) 
 
Factor analysis is an analytical tool that determines empirically how many constructs or latent 
variables or factors underlie a set of items (De Vellies, 1991).  Two commonly used methods 
for extracting factors are Principal Component Analysis and Principal Axis Factoring 
(Russell, 2002).  Principal Component Analysis and Principal Axis Factoring essentially 
involve the same procedure for extracting factors from a correlation matrix.  However, the 
fundamental difference between the two approaches is the variance that each variable shares 
with the other measured variables (Russell, 2002).  In Principal Component Analysis, the 
prior communalities equal 1.0.  In Principal Axis Factoring the communalities are estimates 
of the item reliability on the factor.  A communality is defined as an estimate of the item 
reliability of a single variable on a latent variable.  It represents the extent to which a 
particular variable is correlated with the total score of a factor.  In this study, the items were 
subjected to Principal Component Analysis.  Principal Component Analysis takes a set of 





variables and defines a new set of variables (completely recapturing all of the variability 
among the original set of variables) (De Vellies. 1991).  Stevens (1996) highlights a 
preference for Principal Component Analysis because it is psychometrically sound, and 
avoids some of the potential problems with ‘factor indeterminacy’ associated with factor 
analyses (Stevens, 1996, p. 363).   
 
2.9.1.2 Data Screening 
 
It was important to check if all the data were in place and accounted for, and to check the data 
for inaccuracies, absent or missing data.  When considering this it was important to establish 
whether there was a pattern to any missing data.  This may have indicated problems with the 
sample understanding or answering specific questions.  
 
Frequency tables and histograms for each item were examined to identify items with 
extremely skewed response distributions.  The histograms allowed for a visual approximation 
of the distribution shape and it was helpful to visually determine how close responses on each 
question were to a normal distribution.  Within this process the researcher was also checking 
that each item was responded to with the full range of scores. 
 
2.9.1.3 Suitability Phase for Principal Component Analysis 
 
Principal Component Analysis is based on the correlation matrix of the variables involved, 
and correlations usually need a large sample size before they stabilize.  Tabachnick and Fidell 





(1996) state that the sample size must be greater than 150.  This was ensured prior to 
analysis.   
 
The data were checked for sufficient multicollinearity in the correlation matrix (i.e. the 
correlation matrix for the variables must contain two or more correlations of 0.30 or greater).  
This concern reflects the factorability of the correlation matrix (Tabachnick and Fiddell, 
2001).  Muticollinearity was examined through the use of Bartlett’s test of sphericity.  
Bartlett’s test of sphericity has to be statistically significant (p < .05) in order to proceed with 
factor analysis.  Bartlett’s test of sphericity tests the null hypothesis that the correlation 
matrix is an identity matrix.  An identity matrix is a matrix in which all of the diagonal 
elements are 1 and all off diagonal elements are 0 (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994).   
 
The data were also checked to see whether the overall measure of sampling adequacy was 
0.50 or higher.  Sampling adequacy predicts if the data are likely to factor well, based on the 
correlations and partial correlations.   The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO; Kaiser, 1974) was 
adopted to establish whether the overall measure of sampling adequacy for the set of 
variables exceeded the minimum requirement of 0.50.   The KMO statistic varies between 0 
and 1.  A value of 0 indicates that the sum of partial correlations indicates diffusion in the 
pattern of correlations.  A value close to 1 indicates that patterns of correlations are relatively 
compact and so factor analysis should yield distinct and reliable factors.  Kaiser (1974) 
recommends accepting values greater than 0.5 as “acceptable”.  Values between 0.8 and 0.9 
are considered “great” and values above 0.9 are considered “superb”.   Principal Component 
Analysis requires the above requirements to be satisfied before proceeding with the analysis.  





If the above requirements are not met, factor analysis is not appropriate.  Froman (2001) 
argues that by meeting the above requirements, measurement of variables become more 
sound.  
 
2.9.1.4 Criteria for Determining the Number of Factors 
 
Once the factors have been extracted from the correlation matrix, the researcher has to 
determine how many factors to retain.  Two criteria that are often used to determine the 
number of factors is Kaiser’s criterion and the scree test attributed to Cattell (as cited in 
Russell, 2002).  Thurstone (1974) recommends accepting eigenvalues in excess of 1.  This is 
sometimes referred to as the Kaiser (1960) criterion (Russell, 2002).  The eigenvalues refer to 
the amount of variance explained by a factor (Russell, 2002).  They are computed by 
squaring the loadings on a factor and summing them.  Another technique often used is the 
scree test (Cattell, 1966).  In order to determine the number of factors on a scree test, one has 
to look for a break in the values.  The number of factors prior to the drop represents the 
number of factors to be extracted.  Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum and Strahan (as cited in 
Russell, 2002) indicate that examining the scree plot for breaks provides a reasonably 
accurate indication of the number of factors.  Both techniques were explored when examining 
the data.  
   
2.9.1.5 Rotation Methods 
 
Rotation of the factors refers to the shifting of the factors in the factor space to maximize the 
interpretation of the factor loadings (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994).  Rotation can be 
classified into two types, orthogonal and oblique (Russell, 2002).  Orthogonal rotation is 





conducted in such a manner that the factors are uncorrelated with one another.  This 
procedure assists in the interpretation of the factors.  The form of orthogonal rotation most 
often used is termed varimax.  The varimax procedure maximizes the interpretation of 
factors.  A second type of rotation is oblique rotation.  In oblique rotation the factors are 
allowed to correlate with one another (Russell, 2002).  This procedure is most representative 
of the true relationship between the factors.  In summary, oblique rotation allows the latent 
constructs to be correlated with each other whereas orthogonal rotation leads to latent 
constructs that have zero correlation between them.   
 
Russell (2002) suggests that while orthogonal rotations simplify the presentation and 
interpretation of factor analysis results, they often do not lead to simple structures due to the 
underlying correlations between the factors.  He recommends that investigators should 
conduct an oblique rotation.  Furthermore, Netemeyer, Bearden, & Sharma (2003) suggest 
that an oblique rotation allows the factors to correlate and can provide more meaningful 
theoretical factors.  For the purposes of this research, the oblique rotation procedure was 
used.  Fabrigar et al. (1999) recommends that investigators use procedures such as Promax 
when conducting an oblique rotation. 
 
2.9.1.6 Item Analysis 
 
Factor analysis is a technique for data reduction.  The principle aim is to find out which, 
among the items that the investigator is testing, need to be kept and those which should not be 
kept (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994).  The researcher reviewed the factor loadings for each 
item.  The factor loadings indicate how much each item belongs to each of the underlying 





factors.  The researcher selected those items that loaded highly on the factor or factors (i.e. 
the underlying concept or concepts).  More specifically, items with factor loadings smaller 
than 0.4 were removed from the analysis.  Cross factor loadings were also removed to ensure 
that each item loaded onto only one factor.  Several iterations of Principal Component 
Analysis were conducted in order to reach a satisfactory factor solution.  The researcher 
attached a descriptive name for each of the factors once they were extracted and identified.  
 
2.9.1.7 Reliability Analysis  
 
Nunnally and Berstein (1994) suggest that exploratory factor analytic results tend to 
capitalize on chance aspects of the item associations.  They suggest that an important step is 
to conduct reliability analyses once potential scales are identified. The reliability statistics 
provide another form of evidence of how well the items within a scale define a construct.  
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha provides an estimate of the internal consistency of the entire 
scale. This estimate of internal consistency is mathematically equivalent to an estimate of a 
hypothetical correlation that would result if a parallel form of the scale were created and the 
correlation between the alternate form and the original form were calculated (Hatcher, 1994).  
The higher the score, the more reliable the generated scale is. Nunnally (1978) has indicated 
0.7 to be an acceptable reliability coefficient.  De Vellis (2003) has delineated the following 
ranges: below .60 is unacceptable, .60 to .65 is undesirable, .65 to .70 is minimally 
acceptable, .70 to .80 is respectable, .80 to .90 is very good, and the scale should be shortened 
if the alpha is above .90. Internal consistencies of the total scale and the subscales, as 
measured by Cronbach’s alpha, were analysed.   Items that contributed negatively to the 
scales alpha were removed.    





2.10 Study 2 
 
2.10.1.1 Factor Analysis (Principal Component Analysis) 
 
Principal Component Analysis was used in study 2 to further establish the structural validity 
of the scale.  The procedure outlined in study 1 above was used.  
 
2.10.1.2 Correlational Analysis  
 
A Pearson Correlation Co-efficient was conducted to examine whether there was an 
association between participants’ scores on the different questionnaires and the full score of 















3 CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS 
3.1 Study 1 Factor Analysis (Principal Component Analysis) 
 
3.1.1 Sample Characteristics  
 
The sample comprised 425 participants: 142 were male (33.4%) and 283 were female 
(66.6%).  Of the respondents 253 (59.5%) were aged between 17-24, 140 (32.9%) were aged 
between 25-34, 12 (3.5%) were aged between 35-44, 8 (1.9%) were aged between 45-55 and 
9 (2.1%) were over 55. 
 
3.1.2 Data Screening 
 
Frequency distributions indicated that three items had a skewed (non-symmetric) distribution.  
Item 8 “I feel like my thoughts need to change before I can have a good life” indicated a 
negative skew.  Item 40 “There is more to me than my thoughts” and item 42 “It’s possible 
for me to have negative thoughts about myself and still know that I am an OK person” 
indicated a positive skew.  However on further examination the items were only marginally 
skewed and all three items had the full range of responses.  After considering this and the 
possibility that retaining the three items could affect the factor analysis, the researcher 
reached the decision to retain all three items based on the hypothesis that the sample of 









3.1.3 Factorability of Correlation Matrix 
 
The sample size was considered large enough for the analyses (Gorsuch, as cited in 
MacCallum et al. 1999; Guilford, as cited in MacCallum et al. 1999; Cattle, as cited in 
MacCallum et al. 1999).  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measures of sampling adequacy and 
Bartlett's tests of sphericity were evaluated for the factorability of the correlation matrix (i.e., 
to determine whether the items could be classified into a few categories) (Stevens, 2002).  
The factorability of the correlation matrix comprising 42 items was found to be adequate 
according to several indicators.  The KMO measure of sampling adequacy was .91, which 
indicated a “meritorious” degree of non-unique covariance amongst the set of items (Kaiser, 
1974).  A significant Bartlett's test of sphericity indicated that the correlation matrix was 
significantly different (p<0.001).  This suggests that the correlations were not found to 
constitute an identity matrix.  Threats to multicollinearity and singularity were also checked 
and excluded.  Taken together, these tests provide a minimum standard which should be 
passed before a Principal Components Factor Analysis should be conducted.  All 42 items 
were retained for analysis.  
 
3.1.4 Factor Extraction  
 
Ten components attained eigenvalues >1.0 (10.9, 3.10, 2.35, 1.64, 1.47, 1.30, 1.22, 1.18, 










Table 3.1: Eigenvalues and Percentage of Variance of Components 
Component Initial Eigenvalues 
  Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 
10.949 26.068 26.068 
2 
3.104 7.390 33.458 
3 
2.353 5.603 39.062 
4 
1.644 3.913 42.975 
5 
1.475 3.511 46.486 
6 
1.301 3.098 49.585 
7 
1.225 2.918 52.502 
8 
1.184 2.818 55.320 
9 
1.075 2.559 57.879 
10 
1.023 2.435 60.314 
11 
.975 2.322 62.636 
12 
.932 2.218 64.854 
13 
.895 2.132 66.986 
14 
.836 1.991 68.977 
15 
.781 1.859 70.836 
16 
.756 1.799 72.635 
17 
.713 1.698 74.333 
18 
.672 1.600 75.932 
19 
.638 1.518 77.451 
20 
.627 1.494 78.944 
21 
.611 1.455 80.400 
22 
.591 1.407 81.807 






.577 1.374 83.181 
24 
.547 1.303 84.484 
25 
.542 1.290 85.774 
26 
.473 1.127 86.901 
27 
.466 1.109 88.011 
28 
.452 1.077 89.088 
29 
.426 1.014 90.102 
30 
.419 .996 91.099 
31 
.404 .961 92.060 
32 
.385 .916 92.976 
33 
.377 .898 93.874 
34 
.356 .848 94.722 
35 
.335 .799 95.521 
36 
.322 .766 96.287 
37 
.301 .716 97.003 
38 
.276 .658 97.660 
39 
.273 .649 98.309 
40 
.254 .604 98.913 
41 
.240 .573 99.486 
42 
.216 .514 100.000 
 
 






Figure 3.1: Scree Plot 
 
By Kaiser’s (1974) criterion we should extract ten factors.  However, De Vellis (1991) 
recommends that a scree plot should be used when the sample size is above three hundred or 
more cases.  The graphical scree plot proposed by Cattell (1966) was therefore used to reduce 
the number of components from the items in the instrument. The scree plot indicates the 
presence of two clear components.  However, it also indicates the possibility of there being a 
third component and a fourth component. Before the final decision concerning the number of 
components was reached, the researcher reviewed the pattern matrix with promax rotation.  
In order to establish the number of components to retain, the researcher and her Academic 





Supervisor reviewed the items that loaded onto the four components.  Items based on factor 
loadings of > .3 on one factor and < .3 on the other factor were reviewed.  Component three 
revealed that three items met this criterion.  Reliability analysis using Cronbach’s coefficient 
alpha indicated .15 for the three items.  The decision was reached to exclude this as a 
component as the component did not yield a high reliability for the three items.  In terms of 
component four, four items met the criterion as set above.  Reliability analysis using 
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha indicated .58 for the four items.  However, component four was 
not interpretable because both fusion and defusion items loaded onto it and not in 
theoretically consistent ways.  Therefore, the decision was reached to retain only two 
components.     
 
3.1.5 Item Reduction 
 
Several iterations of a restricted two factor solution of Principal Component Analysis with 
oblique rotation (promax) was conducted.   
 
Items based on factor loadings of > .3 on one factor and < .3 on the other factor were 
retained.  Thirty-one items met this criteria. The items are outlined below.  
 
 1.  “My thoughts cause me distress or emotional pain” 
 2.  “I tell myself that I shouldn’t be thinking the way I’m thinking” 
3.  “Even when I am having distressing thoughts, I know that they may become less 
important eventually” 
4.  “I find myself preoccupied with the future or the past” 





5.  “I make judgements about whether my thoughts are good or bad” 
6.  “Even when I’m having upsetting thoughts, I can see that those thoughts may not 
be literally true” 
7.  “I get upset with myself for having certain thoughts” 
8.  “I feel like my thoughts need to change before I can have a good life” 
9.  “I find it easy to view my thoughts from a different perspective” 
10. “I tend to get very entangled in my thoughts” 
11. “I think some of my thoughts are bad or inappropriate” 
12. “I do not over-analyse my thoughts” 
14. “It’s such a struggle to let go of upsetting thoughts even when I know that letting 
go would be helpful” 
16. “I get so caught up in my thoughts that I am unable to do the things that I most 
want to do” 
17. “I over-analyse situations to the point where it’s unhelpful to me” 
18. “I can watch my thoughts from a distance without getting caught up in them” 
19. “There are certain areas in my life where my thoughts are rigid or inflexible” 
20. “I get so caught up in my thoughts that I don’t see other people’s point of view” 
21. “I am able to do what’s important in my life even when I have upsetting thoughts” 
22. “I struggle with my thoughts” 
24. “I can be aware of my thoughts without necessarily reacting to them” 
28. “I get so caught up in my thoughts that I forget what I’m actually doing” 
29. “I tend to react very strongly to my thoughts” 
33. “My mind is capable of having upsetting thoughts, but I can live with them” 
34. “I need to control the thoughts that come into my head” 
35. “Once I’ve thought about something upsetting its difficult for me to focus on 
anything else” 





37. “I brood over past events” 
38. “I can do difficult things even if my thoughts say they are impossible to do” 
40. “There is more to me than my thoughts” 
41. “I worry a great deal” 
42. “It’s possible for me to have negative thoughts about myself and still know that I 
am an OK person” 
 
Principal Component Analysis using oblique rotation (promax) was performed on the 
remaining 31 items.  Reliability analysis using Cronbach’s coefficient alpha indicated an 
internal consistency of .79.  The decision was reached to remove items that would yield a 
higher Cronbach’s alpha than .79.  Four items met this criteria and they are outlined below. 
 
12. “I do not over-analyse my thoughts” 
18. “I can watch my thoughts from a distance without getting caught up in them” 
40. “There is more to me than my thoughts” 
41. “I worry a great deal” 
 
Item 12 and item 40 were deleted for this reason.  The researcher decided to retain item 18 
and item 41 as both items represented an important aspect of defusion. 
 
Principal Component Analysis with oblique rotation (promax) was repeated for the remaining 
29 items.  In order to clarify the two factors further items based on loadings of > .4 on one 
factor and < .4 on the other factor were retained.  Twenty-two items met this criteria.  This 
included the following items: 






1.  “My thoughts cause me distress or emotional pain” 
 2.  “I tell myself that I shouldn’t be thinking the way I’m thinking” 
3.  “Even when I am having distressing thoughts, I know that they may become less 
important eventually” 
4.  “I find myself preoccupied with the future or the past” 
5.  “I make judgements about whether my thoughts are good or bad” 
6.  “Even when I’m having upsetting thoughts, I can see that those thoughts may not 
be literally true” 
7.  “I get upset with myself for having certain thoughts” 
8.  “I feel like my thoughts need to change before I can have a good life” 
9.  “I find it easy to view my thoughts from a different perspective” 
10. “I tend to get very entangled in my thoughts” 
11. “I think some of my thoughts are bad or inappropriate” 
14. “It’s such a struggle to let go of upsetting thoughts even when I know that letting 
go would be helpful” 
16. “I get so caught up in my thoughts that I am unable to do the things that I most 
want to do” 
17. “I over-analyse situations to the point where it’s unhelpful to me” 
18. “I can watch my thoughts from a distance without getting caught up in them” 
21. “I am able to do what’s important in my life even when I have upsetting thoughts” 
22. “I struggle with my thoughts” 
24. “I can be aware of my thoughts without necessarily reacting to them” 
28. “I get so caught up in my thoughts that I forget what I’m actually doing” 
29. “I tend to react very strongly to my thoughts” 
34. “I need to control the thoughts that come into my head” 





35. “Once I’ve thought about something upsetting its difficult for me to focus on 
anything else” 
 
The researcher decided to retain item 38 “I can do difficult things even if my thoughts say 
they are impossible to do” and item 42 “It’s possible for me to have negative thoughts about 
myself and still know that I am an OK person” as these items were theoretically related to the 
construct of defusion. 
 
Principal Component Analysis using oblique rotation (promax) was conducted on the 
remaining 24 items, restricting the factor analysis to a two-factor solution.  The KMO 
(Kaiser, 1974) measure of sampling adequacy was repeated with the 24-item version, which 
indicated .91.  The Bartlett test of sphericity was also repeated.  This yielded a highly 
significant result (p<0.001).   
 
The solution consisted of two components (24 items, m = 91.3, sd = 13.9), accounting for 
44% of the variance in that set of items.  Based on item content, the components were 
labelled fusion (16 items, m = 54.8, sd = 14.8) and defusion (8 items, m = 36.5, sd = 6.5).  
These components accounted for 32.6% and 11.4% of the variance respectively.  Data for all 










Table 3.2: Descriptive Data and Factor Loadings for the 24 items in the CFQ 
 
Item Number Component 
  1 2 
1    My thoughts cause me distress or emotional pain .702 .109 
2    I tell myself that I shouldn’t be thinking the way 
I’m thinking .681 .259 
3    Even when I am having distressing thoughts, I 
know     that they may become less important 
eventually 
-.194 .628 
4    I find myself preoccupied with the future or the 
past .619 .116 
5    I  make judgements about whether my thoughts 
are good or bad .537 .345 
6    Even when I’m having upsetting thoughts, I can 
see that those thoughts may not literally be true -.153 .748 
7    I get upset with myself for having certain 
thoughts .708 .290 
8    I feel like my thoughts need to change before I 
can have a good life .758 .103 
9    I find it easy to view my thoughts from a different  
perspective .026 .478 
10   I tend to get very entangled in my thoughts .689 .022 
11   I think some of my thoughts are bad or 
inappropriate .596 .289 
14   It’s such a struggle to let go of upsetting thoughts 
even when I know that letting go would be helpful .678 -.063 
16   I get so caught up in my thoughts that I am 
unable to do the things that I most want to do .745 .050 
17   I over-analyse situations to the point where it’s 
unhelpful to me .726 -.025 
18   I can watch my thoughts from a distance without 
getting caught up in them -.447 .399 





21   I am able to do what’s important in my life even 
when I have upsetting thoughts -.357 .511 
22   I struggle with my thoughts .771 .065 
24   I can be aware of my thoughts without 
necessarily reacting to them -.437 .444 
28   I get so caught up in my thoughts that I forget 
what I’m actually doing .563 .127 
29   I tend to react very strongly to my thoughts .567 -.007 
34   I need to control the thoughts that come into my 
head .549 .071 
35  Once I have thought about something upsetting 
its difficult for me to focus on anything else .648 -.183 
38  I can do difficult things even if my thoughts say 
they are impossible to do -.179 .428 
42  Its possible for me to have negative thoughts 
about myself and still know that I am an ok person -.359 .386 
 
3.1.6 Reliability analysis 
 
Internal consistencies, as measured by Cronbach’s alpha, were .92 (fusion), .76 (defusion), 
and .81 (total scale).  The correlation between the components as derived from the Principal 
Component Analysis indicated that there was a weak relationship between the components (r 
= -.253).    
 
3.1.7 Gender Differences 
 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to test for a gender difference between the two 
components.  Prior to conducting an independent samples t-test the distributions of the two 





components were reviewed.  The fusion component depicted in Figure 3.2 indicated a normal 
distribution.    
 
 
Figure 3.2: Fusion Component Frequency Distributions 
 









The defusion component depicted in figure 3.3 also revealed a normal distribution. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Defusion Component Frequency Distributions 
 










3.1.8 Study 1 Summary of Findings 
 
 The results of study 1 provide initial support for the CFQ.  The items were chosen 
based on the judgement that the items were relevant to Hayes et al’s. (1999) notion of 
cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion.  Repeated Principal Component Analysis 
resulted in a two factor solution as the most appropriate grouping of the items.  The 
remaining items were conceptually and theoretically congruent with the constructs of 




















3.2 Study 2 
 
3.2.1 Additional Questions 
 
A similar study to the researcher’s study was being conducted elsewhere in the UK.   
Through collaboratively working with the other researchers, the Principal Researcher and her 
Academic Supervisor included four questions that had performed well in Dr. Frank Bond’s 
and Dr. Helen Bolderston’s scale to the current scale being developed in this research to fully 
capture the theoretical constructs of cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion. Three questions 
pertained to the construct of cognitive fusion and one question related to the construct of 
cognitive defusion. 
 
The four questions added to the scale are outlined below. 
 
1. “I feel upset when I have negative thoughts about myself” 
2. “I get very focussed on distressing thoughts” 
3. “My thoughts distract me from what I'm actually doing” 
4. “Its OK to have inconsistent thoughts on the same subject” 
 
The final questionnaire in study 1 therefore consisted of 28 items (See Appendix 13).  Of the 
28 items, 19 items contained cognitive fusion items (fusion) and 9 items contained cognitive 
defusion items (defusion). 





Once the structural validity of the scale had been explored, the next area of focus in the 
validation of the scale was the external validity component.  The purpose of study 2 was to 
establish the external validity of the CFQ by subjecting it to a series of validity analyses, 
including correlations with criteria measures.     
 
Participant’s ratings on the 28 item CFQ were subjected to Principal Component Analysis 
using oblique rotation (promax) to determine whether the two-factor solution could be 
replicated with another sample of participants. 
 
3.2.2 Sample Characteristics 
 
The sample comprised 167 participants.  135 were female (80.8%) and 32 were male 
(19.2%).  Of the respondents 128 (76.6%) were aged between 17-24, 33 (19.8%) were aged 
between 25-34 and 6 (3.6%) were aged between 35-44.   
 
3.2.3 Data Screening  
 
Frequency distributions showed one item with an extremely skewed response distribution.  
Item 22 “I struggle with my thoughts” was removed for this reason.   
 
3.2.4 Factorability of Correlation Matrix 
 
The sample size was considered large enough for the analyses (Gorsuch, as cited in 
MacCallum et al. 1999; Guilford, as cited in MacCallum et al. 1999; Cattle, as cited in 
MacCallum et al. 1999).  The KMO (Kaiser, 1974) measure of sampling adequacy (.88) 





indicated satisfactory factorability of the correlation matrix.  Similarly, Bartlett’s tests of 
sphericity (p<0.001) indicated that the correlation matrix was significantly different.  A 
Principal Component Analysis using oblique rotation (promax) was performed on 27 items.  
 
3.2.5 Factor Extraction 
 
Six components attained eigenvalues >1.0 (8.52, 3.07, 1.68, 1.25, 1.16, 1.07).  Table 3.4 



















Table 3.4: Eigenvalues and Percentage of Variance of Components 
Component Initial Eigenvalues 




1 8.521 31.557 31.557
2 3.075 11.388 42.946
3 1.687 6.249 49.195
4 1.256 4.652 53.847
5 1.116 4.132 57.979
6 1.079 3.997 61.975
7 .939 3.477 65.452
8 .910 3.372 68.824
9 .787 2.915 71.739
10 .751 2.783 74.522
11 .692 2.564 77.086
12 .616 2.282 79.367
13 .552 2.043 81.410
14 .550 2.036 83.447
15 .504 1.865 85.312
16 .484 1.794 87.105
17 .446 1.650 88.756
18 .435 1.610 90.366
19 .385 1.428 91.793
20 .378 1.398 93.191





21 .339 1.257 94.449
22 .330 1.224 95.672
23 .287 1.064 96.736
24 .277 1.027 97.764
25 .237 .877 98.641
26 .194 .718 99.359


















Figure 3.4:  Scree Plot 
 
The scree plot depicted in Figure 3.4 clearly indicates the presence of two clear factors.  
However, it also indicates the possibility of there being a third component.  In order to 
establish the number of components to retain, the researcher and her academic supervisor 
reviewed the items that loaded onto the three components.  Items based on factor loadings of 
> .3 on one factor and < .3 on the other factor were reviewed.  Component three revealed that 
five items met this criterion.  However, after considerable time reviewing the three 
components and the items within each component the decision was reached to exclude 
component three.  As in Study 1, the third component could not be interpreted and the 
researcher and her Academic Supervisor decided that retaining only two components was in 





line with the theoretical literature on ACT.  Therefore, the decision was reached to retain only 
two components. 
 
3.2.6 Item Reduction 
 
Several iterations of a restricted two factor solution of Principal Component Analysis with 
oblique rotation (promax) were conducted. 
 
Items based on factor loadings of >.6 on one factor and <.4 on the other factor were retained.  
The researcher was aware that the factor loadings on the defusion component were not as 
high as those factors on the fusion component.  Cognitive defusion represents an important 
construct in ACT.  Both the researcher and her Academic Supervisor decided that in spite of 
the low factor loadings, those questions pertaining to defusion should be kept.  To ensure this, 
the decision was reached to lower the factor loading criteria on one component to allow for 
the retention of defusion items.  Sixteen items met this criteria.  These items are outlined 
below. 
 
 1.  “My thoughts cause me distress or emotional pain”. 
 2.  “I tell myself that I shouldn’t be thinking the way I’m thinking”. 
3.  “Even when I am having distressing thoughts, I know that they may become less 
important eventually”. 
7.  “I get upset with myself for having certain thoughts”. 
 8.  “I feel like my thoughts need to change before I can have a good life”. 
 9.  “I find it easy to view my thoughts from a different perspective”. 





 10. “I tend to get very entangled in my thoughts”. 
 13. “I get very focused on distressing thoughts”. 
14. “It’s such a struggle to let go of upsetting thoughts even when I know that letting 
go would be helpful”. 
15. “My thoughts distract me from what I’m actually doing”. 
17. “I over-analyse situations to the point where it’s unhelpful to me”. 
19. “It is OK to have inconsistent thoughts on the same subject”. 
20. “It’s possible for me to have negative thoughts about myself and still know that I 
am an OK person”. 
25. “Once I’ve thought about something upsetting it’s difficult for me to focus on 
anything else”. 
26. “I need to control the thoughts that come into my head”. 
27. “I tend to react very strongly to my thoughts”.  
 
Principal Component Analysis using oblique rotation (promax) was repeated for the 
remaining 16 items.  In order to reduce the number of items further, items based on loadings 
of > .65 on one factor and < .4 on the other factor were retained.  Again, due to the 
importance of cognitive defusion, the researcher and her Academic Supervisor decided to 
lower the factor loading criteria on one component to allow for the retention of defusion 
questions.  Fourteen items met this criteria.  This included the following items. 
 
1.  “My thoughts cause me distress or emotional pain”. 
 2.  “I tell myself that I shouldn’t be thinking the way I’m thinking”. 
3.  “Even when I am having distressing thoughts, I know that they may become less 
important eventually”. 





7.  “I get upset with myself for having certain thoughts”. 
 8.  “I feel like my thoughts need to change before I can have a good life”. 
 10. “I tend to get very entangled in my thoughts”. 
 13. “I get very focussed on distressing thoughts”. 
14. “It’s such a struggle to let go of upsetting thoughts even when I know that letting 
go would be helpful”. 
17. “I over-analyse situations to the point where it’s unhelpful to me”. 
19. “It is OK to have inconsistent thoughts on the same subject”. 
20. “It’s possible for me to have negative thoughts about myself and still know that I 
am an OK person”. 
25. “Once I’ve thought about something upsetting it’s difficult for me to focus on 
anything else”. 
26. “I need to control the thoughts that come into my head”. 
27. “I tend to react very strongly to my thoughts”.  
 
The Researcher decided to retain item 9 “I find it easy to view my thoughts from a different 
perspective” as this item represented an important aspect of defusion.  
 
Principal Component Analysis using oblique rotation (promax) was performed on the final 15 
items.  The researcher decided to extract two components.  The KMO (Kaiser, 1974) measure 
of sampling adequacy was repeated with the 15-item version, which indicated .89.  The 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity was also repeated.  This indicated a highly significant result 
(p<0.001).   
 





The final solution consisted of two components (15 items, m = 52.1, sd = 12.6), accounting 
for 54% of the variance in that set of items.  Based on item content, the components were 
labelled fusion (11 items, m = 39.4, sd = 11.3) and defusion (4 items, m = 12.4, sd = 3.76).  
These components accounted for 40% and 14% of the variance respectively.  Data for all 






















Table 3.5: Descriptive Data and Factor Loadings for the 15 items in the CFQ 
Item Number Component 
  1 2 
1    My thoughts cause me distress or emotional pain .727 .198 
2    I tell myself that I shouldn’t be thinking the way 
I’m thinking .670 .004 
3    Even when I am having distressing thoughts, I 
know  that they may become less important 
eventually 
-.110 .650 
7    I get upset with myself for having certain 
thoughts .713 .033 
8    I feel like my thoughts need to change before I 
can have a good life .768 -.006 
9    I find it easy to view my thoughts from a different  
perspective -.368 .648 
10   I tend to get very entangled in my thoughts .683 .046 
13  I get very focused on distressing thoughts .822 .164 
14   It’s such a struggle to let go of upsetting thoughts 
even when I know that letting go would be helpful .810 .054 
17   I over-analyse situations to the point where it’s 
unhelpful to me .718 .212 
19  It is OK to have inconsistent thoughts on the 
same subject  -.126 .747 
20  Its possible for me to have negative thoughts 
about myself and still know that I am an OK person -.202 .743 
25  Once I’ve thought about something upsetting its 
difficult for me to focus on anything else .653 .010 
26  I need to control the thoughts that come into my 
head .688 -.060 
27  I tend to react very strongly to my thoughts .686 .085 
 





3.2.7 Reliability Analysis 
 
Internal consistencies, as measured by Cronbach’s alpha, were .91 (fusion), .71 (defusion), 
and .88 (total scale).  The correlation between the components as derived from the Principal 
Component Analysis indicated that there was a weak relationship between the components (r 
= -.170).    
 
3.2.8 Scoring Criteria for the Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire 
 
The 15 items of the CFQ are divided into two domains: cognitive fusion and cognitive 
defusion.  A 7-point Likert scale is used to evaluate the answers; a higher score indicates 
cognitive fusion and a lower score indicates cognitive defusion.  The total subscale score on 
the fusion component is 77. Items 3, 7, 11 and 15 from the final scale (see Appendix 14) are 
reversed when calculating the total subscale score on the defusion component.  The total 
subscale score on the defusion component is 28.  The total score is the sum of the two 
components.  
 
3.2.9 Gender Differences 
 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to test for gender differences in participant 
responses to the CFQ.  However, this was not significant at the 5% level, t (165) = .515, P 
=.295, d = 0.10. 
 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to test for a gender difference between the two 
components.  Prior to conducting an independent samples t-test the distributions of the two 





components were reviewed.  The fusion component depicted in figure 3.5 indicated a normal 
distribution.   
  
 
Figure 3.5: Fusion Component Frequency Distributions 
 









The defusion component depicted in figure 3.6 also revealed a normal distribution. 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Defusion Component Frequency Distributions 
 









Data Analysis (Correlation Analysis) 
 
Data analysis was conducted on a computerised statistical package (SPSS 16) using Pearson 
correlation coefficient tests. All tests were conducted as one tailed tests.  One-tailed tests 
should be used when there is a specific direction to the hypotheses being tested (Nunnally 
and Bernstein, 1994).  An alpha level of .05 was used.  Table 3.6 outlines the correlations for 
the CFQ, the Dieners Satisfactions with Life Scale, the Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire, the Thought Control Questionnaire and the Southampton Mindfulness Scale. 
 
Table 3.6: Pearson Correlations for the CFQ, the Dieners Satisfactions with Life Scale, 
the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire, the Thought Control Questionnaire and the 
Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire. 
 Dieners 
Satisfaction with 

















-.427** .651** .172* -.792** 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed) 
*.   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)  
 
Each hypothesis will now be discussed in turn.  
 
 





3.2.10 Test of Hypothesis One – Convergent Validity  
 
It was expected that those participants that are more fused would have lower levels of life 
satisfaction compared to participants who have low levels of cognitive fusion.    
 
Satisfaction with life was measured using the Dieners Satisfactions with Life Scale (Diener, 
Emmons, Larsen and Griffin, 1985).  
 
Table 3.6 indicates a significant negative correlation between the CFQ and the Deiner’s 
Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener et al. 1985) (r = -.427; n = 167; p<0.01); thus 
participants with higher levels of cognitive fusion have lower levels of life satisfaction.  
Therefore the hypothesis was supported.   The scatter plot in figure 3.7 shows the correlation 






























3.2.11 Test of Hypothesis Two – Convergent Validity 
 
It was expected that participants that are more fused would score higher on experiential 
avoidance.  
 
Avoidance was measured by the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II) (Hayes et 
al. 2004).   
 
There was a significant positive correlation between the CFQ and the Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire (Hayes et al. 2004) (r = .651; n = 167; p<0.01) (See Table 3.6). Thus 
participants who had higher levels of cognitive fusion as measured on the CFQ also had 
higher levels of experiential avoidance.  Therefore the hypothesis was supported.  The scatter 





























3.2.12 Test of Hypothesis Three – Convergent Validity 
 
It was expected that participants with higher levels of cognitive fusion would score higher on 
the TCQ (Wells and Davis, 1994).  
 
As can be seen in Table 3.6, the correlation between the CFQ and the Thought Control 
Questionnaire (Wells and Davis, 1994) was positive (r = .172; n = 167; p<0.01).  This 
highlights that participants who scored higher levels of cognitive fusion also scored higher 
responses on the Thought Control Questionnaire (Wells and Davis, 1994).  Therefore the 
hypothesis was supported.  The scatter plot depicted in figure 3.9 outlines the correlation 
between the two variables.   
 





















3.2.13 Test of Hypothesis Four – Convergent Validity  
 
It was expected that participants that are less fused would score higher on the SMQ 
(Chadwick et al. 2008). 
 
There was a correlation between the CFQ and the Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire 
(Chadwick et al. 2008) (r = -.792; n = 167; p<0.01).  This suggests that participants who 
scored lower on the CFQ scored higher on the Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire 
(Chadwick et al. 2008).  Therefore the hypothesis was supported.  The scatter plot depicted in 































3.3 Study 2 Summary of Findings   
 
 Repeated Principal Component Analysis resulted in a two factor solution as the most 
appropriate grouping of the items.  The items corresponding to the components were 
conceptually and theoretically congruent with the constructs of cognitive fusion and 
cognitive defusion as proposed by Hayes et al. (1999).   
 
 Participants with higher levels of cognitive fusion had lower levels of life satisfaction 
as measured on the Dieners Satisfaction with Life Questionnaire (Diener et al. 1985). 
This hypothesis tested convergent validity. 
 
 Participants who had higher levels of cognitive fusion also had higher levels of 
experiential avoidance as measured on the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire – II 
(Hayes et al. 2004).  This hypothesis tested convergent validity. 
 
 Participants who scored higher levels of cognitive fusion also had higher responses on 
the Thought Control Questionnaire (Wells and Davis, 1994).  This hypothesis tested 
convergent validity.   
 
 Participants who scored lower on the CFQ scored higher on the Southampton 
Mindfulness Questionnaire (Chadwick et al. 2008).  This hypothesis tested 
convergent validity. 
 





4 CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the present study was to develop and provide initial validation of a 
theoretically-based self-report measure of cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion.  The 
construct of cognitive fusion has been defined as the process whereby one becomes entangled 
or fused with the literal context of their thoughts (Hayes et al. (1999).   As previously 
outlined, the concept represents an important component to Hayes et al’s. (1999) model of 
psychopathology.  Cognitive defusion strategies enable the individual to see thoughts and 
feelings as essentially just experiences rather than a structured reality (e.g. rather than facts 
about the world or events that must be responded to).  This component is central to 
psychological flexibility and the construct represents a core process in the ACT model.  
However despite the central importance to the model, both constructs could not be measured 
as a reliable and valid measure of the components had not been developed.   
  
Several questionnaire based measures related to the construct of cognitive fusion and 
cognitive defusion were referred to and were described as having similar properties to the 
constructs (i.e. measure of acceptance, the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire, AAQ 
(Hayes et al. 2004); measures of metacognition, the Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire, MCQ 
(Hatton and Wells, 1997), the Metacognitive Awareness Questionnaire, MAQ (Teasdale et al. 
2001), the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory, MAI (Schraw and Dennison, 1994); measures 
of decentering (mindfulness) the Experiences Questionnaire, EQ (Fresco et al, 2007) the 
Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire, SMQ (Chadwick et al. 2008).  Review of the AAQ 
(Hayes et al. 2004) concluded that while the questionnaire makes reference to the constructs 
of cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion the questionnaire does not capture the constructs 





as a whole.  Similarly, the MCQ (Hatton et al. 1997) measure is specific to generalised 
anxiety disorder, the MAQ (Teasdale et al. 2001) is specific to depression and the MAI 
(Schraw and Dennison, 1994) pertains mostly to the area of learning performance.  Relatedly, 
the EQ (Fresco et al. 2007) was designed as a practical measure to assess the psychotherapy 
process in MBCT; and the SMQ (Chadwick et al. 2008) predominantly assesses mindful 
relating to psychotic phenomenon.  The paucity of an instrument to measure relevant aspects 
of cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion formed the basis for this research.    
 
The study explored the factor structure and psychometric properties of the questionnaire. The 
study tested content and convergent validity associated with the questionnaire. The 
psychometric evidence suggests that the CFQ adequately measures the constructs of 
cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion.  Content validation by members of the ACT Special 
Interest Branch of the BABCP and the local ACT Interest Group, yielded high ratings of the 
representativeness of the components.    
 
4.1 Factor Structure of the CFQ – Study One 
 
The initial scale consisted of forty-two items.  Sixteen of the items reflected items pertaining 
to the construct of cognitive defusion and twenty-six items reflecting the construct of 
cognitive fusion.  Therefore the questionnaire contained both of Hayes et al’s. (1999) 
constructs – one reflecting psychological inflexibility (i.e. cognitive fusion) and the other 
capturing psychological flexibility (i.e. cognitive defusion).  Several iterations of Principal 
Component Analysis resulted in a two component solution as the most appropriate grouping 
of the items.  Items with factor loadings less than 0.4 were removed.  Two items with factor 





loadings less than 0.4 were retained at the researcher’s discretion.  Item retention for factors 
loadings less than 0.4 was predominantly related to those items being theoretically related to 
the constructs in particular the construct of cognitive defusion.  Furthermore, the items in 
question were given high ratings by the Expert Group at the consensus stage and rated as 
items that captured specific aspects of defusion.  This resulted in a final scale of 24 items 
accounting for 44% of the variance.  The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO; Kaiser, 1974) measure 
of sampling adequacy indicated .91.   
 
The first component, the fusion subscale consisted of sixteen items that accounted for 33% of 
the variance.  This component reflected Hayes et al’s. (1999) notion of cognitive fusion. 
Cognitive fusion is defined by the authors as the frequency of acting on thoughts as if they 
are true representations of reality.  The second component, the defusion subscale consisted of 
eight items accounting for 11% of the variance.  This component captures Hayes et al’s. 
(1999) construct of cognitive defusion and the component was appropriately labelled 
defusion (i.e. the tendency to view thoughts as just thoughts) for this reason.  Therefore, the 
two components were considered to be both conceptually and theoretically congruent with 
the authors’ constructs.  The questionnaire demonstrated good internal consistencies, as 
measured by Cronbach’s alpha.  An alpha of .81 was achieved for the total scale and alphas 
of .92 for the fusion subscale and .76 for the defusion subscale was achieved.  According to 
De Vellis (2003), a total scale alpha of .81 is considered very good and an alpha of .92 on the 
fusion subscale is considered superb.  The defusion subscale alpha is slightly less promising 
and an alpha of .76 is considered respectable (De Vellis, 2003).  There were no significant 
gender differences in scores on either factors. 





4.2 Factor Structure and Validity Analysis of the CFQ  – Study Two  
 
Several iterations of Principal Component Analysis were conducted with a separate sample of 
participants to further derive and established the factor structure of the questionnaire.  The 
results of the Principal Component Analysis in study 2 provided support for the hypothesis of 
structural validity as suggested in study 1.  The final scale derived two components with 
fifteen items that accounted for 54% of the variance.  As in the previous study, the two 
components were labelled fusion and defusion and the components accounted for 40% and 
14% of the variance respectively. The fusion component contained eleven items and the 
defusion component contained four items.  The KMO (Kaiser, 1974) measure of sampling 
adequacy indicated .87.  The fifteen item CFQ achieved a higher alpha than the total scale 
alpha achieved for the twenty-four item CFQ derived in study one.  Reliability analysis for 
the 15 Item Questionnaire indicated .88, which is considered as very good according to De 
Vellis (2003).  The fusion subscale in the fifteen items Questionnaire achieved an alpha of 
.91 and is categorised superb (De Vellis, 2003).  Interestingly, this alpha is only marginally 
different from the alpha achieved on the fusion subscale in study one.  However, similar to 
study one the defusion subscale achieved a respectable alpha of .71.    
 
The two components derived from study one and study two were found to have a weak 
correlation.  In the first instance one could assume that this suggests that on a conceptual 
level the constructs of fusion (cognitive fusion) and defusion are two independent, multi-
dimensional components.  However, another possibility for this may be associated with the 
wording of the items, in particular the use of positively and negatively worded items.   
 





Several authors including Nunnally (1978) and De Vellis (1991) advocate the use of 
positively and negatively worded items in instruments to avoid response bias such as 
acquiescence and agreement bias (e.g. the tendency to agree with the survey items, 
independent of the item content).  Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee and Podsakoff (2003, p. 884) 
further argue that negatively worded items act as “cognitive speed bumps that require 
respondents to engage in more controlled, as opposed to automatic, cognitive processing”.  
However, several implications of using negatively worded items in instruments have been 
noted and include that the items worded in the opposite direction are measuring the same 
construct and that respondents are able to reply to positively and negatively worded items 
equivalently (Podsakoff et al. 2003).  A number of authors also acknowledge that using 
positively and negatively worded items may introduce measurement errors that disrupt 
analyses and interpretations of the results (Podsakoff et al. 2003; Quilty, Oakman and Risko, 
2006; DiStefano and Motl, 2006).  More specifically the authors argue that constructs may 
appear multi-dimensional opposed to uni-dimensional when positively and negatively worded 
items are included.  Podsakoff et al. (2003) refer to this as a method effect.  It is possible in 
the current study that the two factors derived from the CFQ (e.g. fusion and defusion) are uni-
dimensional (e.g. measuring the same construct) as opposed to multi-dimensional.  In spite of 
the clear advantages to using negatively worded items, future studies are required to test 
whether method effects are present in the CFQ.  Marsh (1996) and DiStefano and Motl 
(2006) suggest using Confirmatory Factor Analysis to overcome the shortcomings of 
exploratory factor analysis (i.e. the inability to differentiate competing factor structures of a 
scale) to examine the item wording effects.   
 





One of the shortcomings in study two in relation to the structural coherence of the CFQ is the 
sample size.  Bryant and Yarnold (as cited in Grimm & Yarnold, 1995) and Gorsuch (as cited 
in MacCallum et al. 1999) suggest that the subjects-to-variables (STV) should be no lower 
than five for the initial stage of test construction. This calculation was achieved in study one 
and a sample size of 425 participants was obtained.  However, the sample size in study two 
was significantly less and comprised 167 participants accounting for less than half of the 
number of participants in the first study.  It is arguable that a sample size that is closer to the 
first study should also be used when testing the hypothesis of structural coherence of a newly 
constructed scale.  One of the advantages of ensuring this might support the likelihood that 
the results across studies are based on the properties of the scale being tested, rather than the 
size of the sample. 
 
4.3 Validity of the CFQ – Study Two 
 
The CFQ underwent a series of external validity analyses in particular convergent validity.  
Convergent validity of the CFQ was demonstrated through significant correlations with life 
satisfaction and experiential avoidance constructs. There was a significant moderate 
correlation between the CFQ and the measure of life satisfaction as measured by Diener et 
al’s. (1985) SWLS.  First, high scores on the CFQ were associated with lower scores on a 
satisfaction with life measure.  This result is considered to be consistent with Hayes et al’s. 
(1999) model of psychopathology.  The process of cognitive fusion sucks people into 
prolonged and chronic psychological distress and rigidity in behavioural responding (Hayes 
et al. 1999).  It is argued that as an individual’s level of psychopathology becomes more 
entrenched, their overall satisfaction with life becomes less.  This result is also consistent 





with research showing that recurrent negative thinking results in greater levels of 
psychopathology and ultimately reduced life satisfaction (Conway et al. (2000); Nolen-
Hoeksema et al. (1991); Nolen-Hoeksema, (1993); Rachman, (1998); Salkovskis, (1998). 
 
As predicted the CFQ correlated strongly with experiential avoidance as measured by Hayes 
et al’s. (2004) AAQ-II.  Hayes and colleagues (1999) argue that human suffering originates 
from psychological inflexibility fostered by experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion.  
Therefore, this result is consistent and in line with the theoretical underpinnings of ACT.  As 
previously mentioned the AAQ and the AAQ-II incorporate several ACT processes (Hayes et 
al. 2004) including items that target links between experiential avoidance and excessively 
negative evaluations of private experience, inaction, the need for cognitive and emotional 
control and the literalness of thought (Barnes-Holmes et al. 2004).  When reviewing the items 
included in the AAQ-II with items in the CFQ, it appears that some of the questions overlap 
(i.e. AAQ-II item “I worry about not being able to control my worries and feelings” is similar 
in content to the CFQ item “I need to control the thoughts that come into my head”).  
Furthermore, the AAQ-II item “My thoughts and feelings do not get in the way of how I want 
to live my life” is similar in content to the CFQ item “I am able to do what’s important in my 
life even when I have upsetting thoughts”.  It may be that the AAQ-II and the current 
questionnaire are measuring similar properties and this may account for the large correlation 
between the two measures.  This may indeed be the case but as suggested previously, the 
sample size used to determine this result was relatively small (i.e. n = 167).  It is likely that 
further research, conducted with larger sample sizes will be necessary to help confirm this.  
Nevertheless, when the items were examined and reviewed it is clear that the CFQ 





predominantly targets the constructs of cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion and the items 
are reflective of this.   
 
The CFQ related highly to measures concerning individual’s beliefs about worry (the 
Thought Control Questionnaire, TCQ; Wells and Davis, 1994) and mindful responding to 
unpleasant thoughts and images (the Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire, SMQ; 
Chadwick et al. 2008).  The CFQ correlated positively, albeit weakly, with the TCQ (Wells 
and Davis, 1994).   
 
As expected the CFQ also correlated significantly and very strongly with the SMQ 
(Chadwick et al. 2008).  When reviewing the items in both questionnaires (i.e. the SMQ and 
the CFQ) it would appear that the items are indeed very similar.  Therefore, it is possible that 
the CFQ and the SMQ are measuring the same thing and that the CFQ, at this stage in the 
scales development, is not measuring anything unique.  However, it should be noted that the 
SMQ was only published after the construction of the CFQ.  Nevertheless, on further 
examination there are several distinct properties of the CFQ that indicate that the scale is 
adding something different to the literature.  One such difference between the two scales is 
that of the theoretical model that informs the development of the CFQ.   
 
Both the SMQ and the current measure predominantly target the relationship between a 
person and their thoughts.  The SMQ also incorporates the theme of decentering from 
thoughts, which as previously described is related to the construct of defusion.  Hayes et al. 
(1999) acknowledge that the concepts of decentering, mindfulness and cognitive defusion are 





strongly related processes but the exact dividing line between these processes is not yet 
understood.  However, the concept of cognitive fusion is embedded in Relational Frame 
Theory (RFT) (i.e. the extent to which one becomes entangled or fused with the literal 
context of their thoughts) (Hayes et al. 1999).  Cognitive defusion is the process of 
undermining the behaviour regulatory functions and literal believability of verbally entangled 
events.  This is thought to result in greater psychological flexibility.  The authors argue that 
this flexibility allows the individual to achieve contact with the present moment more fully as 
a conscious human being and to change or persist with behaviour when doing so serves 
valued ends (Hayes et al. 1999).  This represents a core difference between the CFQ and the 
SMQ.  The mindfulness measures that are currently available target the mindful responding 
aspect but they do not measure the literality and behavioural regulation aspect.  The CFQ 
combines items that measure each of these phenomena and this is implicit in the notions of 
fusion and defusion. This suggests that while the two processes overlap, cognitive defusion is 
not identical to the concept of mindfulness and therefore the CFQ is measuring something 
unique.   
 
As previously outlined, the SMQ was designed to measure the relationship between 
distressing thoughts and images that are central to the phenomena found in clinical disorders 
in particular psychosis.  Moreover, it was developed as a tool to assess mindful responding 
related to psychotic phenomena.  A central strength of the CFQ is that it is not domain 
specific in that the CFQ is not limited to just one type of thought or even one domain of 
thinking.  Rather, the CFQ targets the concept of cognition more generally, focusing 
particularly on the literal context of thoughts, one’s perspective on their thoughts and 





cognitions behavioural regulatory functions.  This represents further differences between the 
two scales. 
4.4 Clinical and Research Implications 
 
The CFQ was developed for both clinical and research purposes and once the validity and 
reliability of the instrument are more fully established, the CFQ may serve as a useful tool in 
both clinical and research settings.  The self-report format and the small number of items 
represent inviting and time saving characteristics of the measure that should make the 
instrument attractive for use in a wide variety of settings.  Clinicians working in the field of 
ACT may find a short measure on cognitive fusion useful for assessing how cognitively fused 
or defused one is with their mental content.  As previously mentioned the only ACT tool 
available is the AAQ or the shortened version, the AAQ-II (Hayes et al. 2004) and both 
measures are not restricted to the constructs of cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion.  The 
instrument may also serve as a pre- and post therapy measure for both clinician and client to 
assess the effectiveness of the ACT model and the techniques that are incorporated within the 
model.  Clinical research in this form would join the growing body of evidence that suggests 
the successful use of ACT with a wide range of clinical disorders including depression (Zettle 
and Hayes, 1986; Zettle and Raines, 1989), workplace stress (Bond and Bunce, 2000), 
chronic pain (Geiser, 1992; Vowles and McCracken, 2008; Wicksell, Ahlqvist, Bring, Melin 
and Olsson, 2008), anxiety disorders (Block and Wulfert, 2000; Zettle, 2003) schizophrenia 
(Bach and Hayes, 2002 and Gaudiano and Herbert, 2006), smoking (Brown, Palm, Strong, 
Lejuez, Kahler, Zvolensky, Hayes, Wilson and Gifford, 2008), substance abuse (Luoma, 
Kohlenberg, Hayes, Bunting and Rye, 2008) and diabetes (Gregg, Callaghan, Hayes and 
Glenn-Lawson, 2007).  






Similarly the ACT research base would benefit from an instrument that solely targets the 
constructs of cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion.  The current measure could help to 
develop further micro-studies focusing on these constructs and it could also isolate the 
process of cognitive defusion to further support how the techniques work in accordance with 
the ACT theory.  Research in this area could further accompany previous micro studies 
conducted on cognitive defusion including Bach and Hayes (2002); Gaudiano and Herbert, 
(2006); Masuda et al. (2004); Hayes et al. (1999); Takahasi et al. (2002). 
 
4.5 Limitations and Future Directions 
 
A fundamental limitation on the conclusions drawn from this study is that the research is 
preliminary in nature.  In the formation and validation of all scales, replication is the 
imperative to further validation.  Further research with the CFQ is essential in order for the 
instrument to be considered a valid and reliable indicator of the constructs of cognitive fusion 
and cognitive defusion as proposed by Hayes et al. (1999).  
 
The CFQ was developed and validated predominantly on a university student cohort.  In 
study one some attempt was made to select participants from the community.  This option 
was explored to yield a higher response rate and to encourage the selection of participants 
from a more diverse sample group.  Unfortunately, this option was not possible in study two 
owing to the researcher having ‘used up’ her community participants.  Furthermore, the 
researcher was limited by the range of participants she could select due to the NHS and 
Edinburgh University ethical constraints.   






A further limitation of study two was that it was predominantly limited to female 
undergraduate and postgraduate students. This result is not surprising as significantly higher 
rates of females can be found studying for Psychology Undergraduate Degrees and Clinical 
Psychology Post-Graduate Degrees.  Again, the researcher was limited to the types of 
University Courses that she could select from due to ethical constraints but undoubtedly, 
higher representations from males would further support the development of this scale.  
Therefore, at this stage in the development of the CFQ, the questionnaire may not be 
generaliseable to other groups and may be specific to a student cohort.   
An important endeavour for future research would be the need to evaluate and validate the 
CFQ with other non-student, non-clinical populations including adults (ages 18-64), older 
adults (>65) and adolescent populations.  Further replication in a treatment-seeking sample 
would also be necessary.  The above replication would further examine the reliability and 
validity of the CFQ and it would also allow for an examination of the CFQ with other 
measures of psychopathology.   
 
Both studies also failed to measure ethnicity.  Future research will need to be done to 
illustrate that the cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion items found here perform as 
robustly across differences in ethnicity.   
 
An important aspect of reliability that was not tested in this research was test-retest 
reliability.   The researcher was aware of this shortcoming when conducting the above 
research but due to the participant selection procedures it was impossible to ensure that the 





same participant would complete the same questionnaires at the prior scheduled interval of 
three weeks.  This shortcoming has important implications.  At this stage in the instrument’s 
development the measure still lacks clarity as to whether the psychometric properties of the 
scale are sound.  Sufficient test-retest reliability will need to be examined for the scale to 
further develop its reliability base.  
 
Another shortcoming of the above research was the failure to address any aspect of 
discriminant validity (i.e. to statistically test whether two constructs differ) (Nunnally and 
Berstein, 1994).  This will need to be explored in future research.  It would be particularly 
interesting to explore how the current questionnaire is related to questionnaires measuring the 
constructs of mindfulness.  The Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Scale (KIMS) (Baer, 
Smith and Allen, 2004) measures four mindfulness skills that include observing, describing, 
acting with awareness and accepting without judgement.  It would be interesting to see how 
the CFQ performs with this questionnaire and to see how the factors in the CFQ perform with 















The above study sought to develop and validate a scale to measure Hayes et al’s. (1999) 
constructs of cognitive fusion and cognitive defusion.  Using Principal Component Analysis 
in two independent samples a questionnaire of two components consisting of fifteen items 
was established.  Cronbach’s alpha for the total scale was .88.  The items were considered to 
be both conceptually and theoretically congruent with the functions of cognitive fusion and 
cognitive defusion as proposed by Hayes et al. (1999).   
 
The study tested content and convergent validity associated with the scale, and significant 
relationships were found to exist between a measure of life satisfaction, beliefs about worry, 
mindful responding to unpleasant thoughts and images and levels of experiential avoidance.  
The study concludes that the CFQ has performed well regardless of it being specific to a 
student cohort.  An important endeavour for future research would be the need to evaluate 
and validate the CFQ with other non-student, non-clinical as well as clinical populations 
including adult (ages 18-64), older adult (>65) and adolescent populations.       
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APPENDIX 1 Item Development Stage – Initial Items and Initial Questionnaire 
 








Dear ACT Colleague, 
 
We at the University of Edinburgh are beginning a project to try and construct a self-report 
measure of cognitive fusion / defusion. We are at the preliminary stage of item generation. It 
would help us greatly if you could read the items we have generated and rate them 
according to how well you think they represent the construct of cognitive fusion. Some of the 
items are deliberately worded to reflect defusion, these of course would be reverse scored in 
the final version. Our intention is to use factor analysis to reduce the items to a manageable 
number and of course to perform reliability analyses and correlational analyses with other 
measures to determine its external validity. 
 
We thank you for your help 
 
David Gillanders & Maria Dempster, University of Edinburgh 
 
 
How representative of cognitive fusion / defusion are these items? 
 
 Not at 
all  





1.  I get so caught up in my thoughts that I don’t see other 
people’s point of view. 
1 2 3 4 
2. People say that I analyse situations too much. 1 2 3 4 
3. My thoughts cause me distress or emotional pain. 1 2 3 4 
4. Even when my mind is going over and over the same thing, I 
understand that thoughts are just thoughts. 
1 2 3        4 
5. Even when I am mistaken about a situation, I find it hard to 
let go of how I’m thinking about it. 
1 2 3 4 
6. My thoughts about certain situations can change relatively 
quickly. 
1 2 3 4 
7. I place great importance on my thoughts. 1 2 3 4 
 






8. I find it hard to get things out of my mind. 1 2 3 4 
9. My opinions about things are rarely fixed. 1 2 3 4 
10. I tell myself that I shouldn’t be thinking the way I’m thinking. 1 2 3 4 
11. I frequently try to change the way I’m thinking. 1 2 3 4 
12. I am able to distance myself from my thoughts as I know 









13. I get very caught up in my thought processes. 1 2 3 4 
14. I can see that my thoughts are just thoughts. 1 2 3 4 
15. I make judgements about whether my thoughts are good or 
bad. 
1 2 3 4 
16. I think some thoughts are bad and inappropriate. 1 2 3 4 
17. I find myself preoccupied with the future or the past. 1 2 3 4 
18. If something upsets me I think about it so much that other 
memories from the past emerge. 
1 2 3 4 
19. I get upset with myself for having certain thoughts. 1 2 3 4 
20. I find it difficult to ignore certain thoughts. 1 2 3 4 
21. I feel like my thoughts need to change before I can have a 
good life. 
1 2 3 4 
22. I am able to rationalise irregular thoughts. 1 2 3 4 
23. I am able to move on from my thoughts. 1 2 3 4 
24. I tend to get very entangled in my thoughts.  1 2 3 4 
25. I am able to stand back from thought processes that are 
overwhelming. 
1 2 3 4 
26. I am able to move on from certain thoughts relatively easily. 1 2 3 4 
27. Even when I’m upset I am able to see that some thoughts 
may not be true. 
 
1 2 3 4 
28. I am constantly aware of what I’m thinking 1 2 3 4 
29. I can easily dismiss certain thoughts. 1 2 3 4 
30. When I find myself dwelling on things, I am able to move on 
relatively quickly. 
1 2 3 4 





31. I do not brood over past events. 1 2 3 4 
32. I do not grasp on to my thoughts and pick them apart. 1 2 3 4 
33. My mind is capable of having unusual or out of the ordinary 
thoughts but I can easily dismiss them.  
1 2 3 4 
34. I have to know the reasons why things happen 1 2 3 4 
35. I am very aware of what I’m thinking. 1 2 3 4 
36. I spend very little time analysing situations. 1 2 3 4 
37. My thoughts must be right before I act  1 2 3 4 
38. I find it easy to switch off from my thoughts. 1 2 3 4 
39. I find it easy to view my thoughts from different angles. 1 2 3 4 
40. My thoughts just come and go and I’m not too attached to 
them. 
1 2 3 4 
41. I see my thoughts as facts. 1 2 3 4 
42. There are certain areas in my life where My thoughts are 
rigid or inflexible. 
1 
 
2 3 4 
43. I never act against my thoughts 1 2 3 4 
44. I very rarely get caught up in thinking. 1 2 3 4 
 
If there are ways of wording items that we have not managed to capture that you would 
ideally wish to see on such a measure, please write them below. 
 
 





APPENDIX 2 Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire – 42 Items 






















APPENDIX 3 Demographic Questionnaire 










1. Gender (please circle) 
 




2. Age Group (please circle) 
 









APPENDIX 4 The Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire (SMQ) (Chadwick, Hember, Symes, 
Peters, Kuipers and Dagnan, 2008). 
 
 





The Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire (SMQ) 
 














1. I am able just to notice them without 
reacting 
       
2. They take over my mind for quite a 
while afterwards 
       
3. I judge the thought/image as good or 
bad 
       
4. I feel calm soon after        
5. I am able to accept the experience        
6. I get angry that this happens to me        
7. I notice how brief thoughts and 
images really are 
       
8. I judge myself as good or bad, 
depending what the thought/image is 
about 
       
9. I ‘step back’ & am aware of the 
thought or image without getting taken 
over by it 
       
10. I just notice them and let them go        
11. I accept myself the same whatever 
the thought/image is about 
       
12. In my mind I try and push them 
away 
       
13. I keep thinking about the thought or 
image after it’s gone 
       
14. I find it so unpleasant I have to 
distract myself & not notice them 
       
15. I try just to experience the thoughts 
or images without judging them 
       









APPENDIX 5 The Dieners Satisfactions with Life Scale (SWLS) (Diener, Emmons, Larsen and Griffin, 
1985). 
 





The Diener’s Satisfaction with Life Scale 
 
Below are five statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1 - 7 scale below, 
indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line 
preceding that item. Please be open and honest in your responding. 
 
 7 - Strongly agree  
 6 - Agree  
 5 - Slightly agree  
 4 - Neither agree nor disagree  
 3 - Slightly disagree  
 2 - Disagree  
 1 - Strongly disagree 
____ In most ways my life is close to my ideal.  
____ The conditions of my life are excellent. 
____ I am satisfied with my life. 
____ So far I have gotten the important things I want in life. 










APPENDIX 6 The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II) (Hayes, Strosahl, Wilson, Bisset, 
Pistorello, Toarmino, Polusny, Dykstra, Batten, Bergan, Stewart, Zvolensky, Eifert, Bond, Forsyth, 
Karekla and McCurry (2004). 
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The Development of a Scale to Measure Cognitive Fusion 
 
Information for Prospective Participants 
 




You are being invited to take part in a research study which involves the construction and 
validation of a questionnaire measuring cognitive fusion.  Previous research has suggested 
that the degree to which people get caught up in their own thoughts and feelings is related to 
their mental well being, and yet we do not currently have a good way of measuring this. We 
are trying to develop a questionnaire measure of this phenomenon, which is known as 
“Cognitive Fusion”. This study is being undertaken for educational purposes and is in part 
contribution towards a doctorate degree in clinical psychology in conjunction with the 
University of Edinburgh and NHS Grampian.  Before you decide if you would like to 
participate it is important that you know a bit more about the study and what participation will 
involve.  Please take time to read the following information carefully and raise any questions 
you may have with the study researcher (contact details are provided at the end of this 
sheet).  Please ask if there is anything you are unclear about or if you would like more 
information. 
 
What is the study about?  
 
While there have been several measures that have already been developed that assesses 
ones individual relationships with ones mental content, there is not a self-report 
questionnaire which currently measures how fused one is with their thoughts.  The aim of the 
research is to establish whether we can accurately measure cognitive fusion using a paper 
and pencil questionnaire. We also want to establish the relationship between cognitive fusion 
and other aspects of thinking, which will be measured using other established 
questionnaires. 
 
Why have I been chosen?  
 
You have been invited because you are an Undergraduate Psychology Student at Edinburgh 
University. 






Do I have to take part in the study? 
 
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary.  This information sheet is for you to 
keep and will help you decide if you would like to take part.   
 
What will participation involve?  
 
If you would like to take part then all you will have to do is complete a pack of paper and 
pencil questionnaires. You will only be asked to complete the questionnaires once.  The 
questionnaire asks about different aspects of your thoughts.  Your responses to all of these 
will be entirely confidential, and should take approximately 5 minutes to complete. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
The information you provide will be extremely valuable in helping us to develop a self-report 
measure of cognitive fusion. It will allow us to compare the measure with other 
questionnaires to establish the relationship between Cognitive Fusion and other aspects of 
thinking and feeling. The successful development of the fusion questionnaire will lead to 
better assessment of this for patients and will also make future research in this area easier, 
due to us having a well established tool for measuring this important phenomenon. As our 
research knowledge progresses we are often able to refine our understanding of 
psychological therapy, which can lead to better treatments for patients in the future.   
 
Will my participation in the study be kept confidential? 
 
The information you provide will be kept strictly confidential.  You will not be personally 
identified in any of the study results or reports.  The only person with direct access to your 
information will be the study researcher and her supervisors.  All of the information held by 
the researcher will be held on a protected database.   
  
Please note:  You may wish to provide your name and address if you wish to receive a 
written summary of the results of this research.  Your contact details will remain strictly 
confidential and will not be made known to anyone outwith the research team. 
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
 
The results will be included in a doctoral thesis submitted to the University of Edinburgh by 
the study researcher.  You will not be identified in this, or in any other report resulting from 
the study.  A brief summary of the results will be made available to all those who participated 
in the study, if requested. You will not be identified in this summary. 
 
Who else knows about the study?  
 
The study has been reviewed by NHS Grampian Research Ethics Committee, and by the 
University of Edinburgh Doctorate in Clinical Psychology Programme Team.   
 





What should I do now?  
 
If you wish to take part:  Please complete the enclosed questionnaires (within one month) 
and return this in the stamped addressed envelope.   
 
If you do not wish to take part:  We would like to thank you for taking the time to read 
through this information sheet.  You need do nothing more.  Your decision not to take part is 
completely respected. 
 
Who can I contact?  
 
If you have been affected by anything in the questionnaire then please feel free to contact 
the Study Researcher on the telephone number given below.   
 
If you have any queries about any aspect of the study or require further information, again, 
please do not hesitate to contact us at the address given below: 
 
 
Mrs Maria Dempster      Dr David Gillanders 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist / Study Researcher  Research Supervisor 
Clinical  & Counselling Psychology Department  School of Health in Social Science 
Royal Cornhill Hospital     Medical School 
Cornhill Road       University of Edinburgh 
Aberdeen       Teviot Place 
AB25 2ZH       Edinburgh 
        EH8 9AG 
 
Telephone: 01224 557219     Telephone: 0131 651 3946 
Email: maria.dempster@nhs.net     Email: 
David.gillanders@ed.ac.uk 
 
Dr George Deans 
Clinical Supervisor 
Chartered Clinical Psychologist 
Clinical & Counselling Psychology Department 





Telephone : 01224 557219 
Email : GEORGE.DEANS@gpct.Grampian.scot.nhs.uk 
 
 










APPENDIX 12 Participant Information Sheet – Study Two 
 
 











The Development of a Scale to Measure Cognitive Fusion 
 
Information for Prospective Participants 
 




You are being invited to take part in a research study which involves the construction and 
validation of a questionnaire measuring cognitive fusion.  Previous research has suggested 
that the degree to which people get caught up in their own thoughts and feelings is related to 
their mental well being, and yet we do not currently have a good way of measuring this. We 
are trying to develop a questionnaire measure of this phenomenon, which is known as 
“Cognitive Fusion”. This study is being undertaken for educational purposes and is in part 
contribution towards a doctorate degree in clinical psychology in conjunction with the 
University of Edinburgh and NHS Grampian.  Before you decide if you would like to 
participate it is important that you know a bit more about the study and what participation will 
involve.  Please take time to read the following information carefully and raise any questions 
you may have with the study researcher (contact details are provided at the end of this 
sheet).  Please ask if there is anything you are unclear about or if you would like more 
information. 
 
What is the study about?  
 
While there have been several measures that have already been developed that assesses 
ones individual relationships with ones mental content, there is not a self-report 
questionnaire which currently measures how fused one is with their thoughts.  The aim of the 
research is to establish whether we can accurately measure cognitive fusion using a paper 
and pencil questionnaire. We also want to establish the relationship between cognitive fusion 











Why have I been chosen?  
 
You have been invited because you are an Undergraduate Psychology Student at Edinburgh 
University. 
 
Do I have to take part in the study? 
 
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary.  This information sheet is for you to 
keep and will help you decide if you would like to take part.   
 
What will participation involve?  
 
If you would like to take part then all you will have to do is complete a pack of paper and 
pencil questionnaires. You will only be asked to complete the questionnaires once.  The 
questionnaires ask a range of questions about your satisfaction with life and different 
aspects of your thoughts.  Your responses to all of these will be entirely confidential, and 
should take approximately 30 minutes to complete. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
The information you provide will be extremely valuable in helping us to develop a self-report 
measure of cognitive fusion. It will allow us to compare the measure with other 
questionnaires to establish the relationship between Cognitive Fusion and other aspects of 
thinking and feeling. The successful development of the fusion questionnaire will lead to 
better assessment of this for patients and will also make future research in this area easier, 
due to us having a well established tool for measuring this important phenomenon. As our 
research knowledge progresses we are often able to refine our understanding of 
psychological therapy, which can lead to better treatments for patients in the future.   
 
Will my participation in the study be kept confidential? 
 
The information you provide will be kept strictly confidential.  You will not be personally 
identified in any of the study results or reports.  The only person with direct access to your 
information will be the study researcher and her supervisors.  All of the information held by 
the researcher will be held on a protected database.   
  
Please note:  You may wish to provide your name and address if you wish to receive a 
written summary of the results of this research.  Your contact details will remain strictly 
confidential and will not be made known to anyone outwith the research team. 
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
 
The results will be included in a doctoral thesis submitted to the University of Edinburgh by 
the study researcher.  You will not be identified in this, or in any other report resulting from 
the study.  A brief summary of the results will be made available to all those who participated 
in the study, if requested. You will not be identified in this summary. 
 





Who else knows about the study?  
 
The study has been reviewed by NHS Grampian Research Ethics Committee, and by the 
University of Edinburgh Doctorate in Clinical Psychology Programme Team.   
 
What should I do now?  
 
If you wish to take part:  Please complete the enclosed questionnaires (within one month) 
and return this in the stamped addressed envelope.   
 
If you do not wish to take part:  We would like to thank you for taking the time to read 
through this information sheet.  You need do nothing more.  Your decision not to take part is 
completely respected. 
 
Who can I contact?  
 
If you have been affected by anything in the questionnaire then please feel free to contact 
the Study Researcher on the telephone number given below.   
 
If you have any queries about any aspect of the study or require further information, again, 
please do not hesitate to contact us at the address given below: 
 
 
Mrs Maria Dempster      Dr David Gillanders 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist / Study Researcher  Research Supervisor 
Clinical  & Counselling Psychology Department  School of Health in Social Science 
Royal Cornhill Hospital     Medical School 
Cornhill Road       University of Edinburgh 
Aberdeen       Teviot Place 
AB25 2ZH       Edinburgh 
        EH8 9AG 
 
Telephone: 01224 557219     Telephone: 0131 651 3946 
Email: maria.dempster@nhs.net     Email: 
David.gillanders@ed.ac.uk 
 
Dr George Deans 
Clinical Supervisor 
Chartered Clinical Psychologist 
Clinical & Counselling Psychology Department 





Telephone : 01224 557219 
Email : GEORGE.DEANS@gpct.Grampian.scot.nhs.uk 
 
 






APPENDIX 13 Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire – 28 Items 
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